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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has been called, among other 
superlatives, a "legislative miracle" and an "historic achieve 
ment." The Tax Act is certainly the most sweeping tax 
legislation since the inception of the tax code in 1913. Even 
though it received overwhelming support in Congress, the Tax 
Act is not without its critics inside and outside Congress. 
Some members of Congress felt that they had been railroaded 
into voting under pressure on a bill that was negotiated 
behind closed doors. Some of the other criticisms came from 
the business sector, especially those businesses that, perceived 
themselves to be adversely affected by the Tax Act.
One provision that threatened to undermine the tax bill 
compromise was the cutback in deductions for individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs): families with income exceeding 
$50,000 and who are covered by employers' pension plans are 
no longer eligible for deductions of contributions to IRAs. 
Individuals not covered by employers' pension plans and 
those whose income is less than $40,000 would still be able to 
retain the full $2,000 deduction in contributions to IRAs. 
Nonworking spouse deduction remains at $250. Reduced 
deductions will be allowed for those with incomes between 
$40,000 and $50,000. Nondeductible contributions up to 
$2,000 with the deferred taxes on earnings still can be made by 
those who are not allowed deductible IRAs. The tax conferees 
resisted all attempts to introduce amendments dealing with 
IRAs because they were afraid of opening the floodgates for 
other amendments.
Another controversial provision was that dealing with 
capital gains. Long-term capital gains are no longer given
preferential tax treatment, but are to be taxed at the same rate 
as other income, i.e., a top rate of 33 percent. Supporters of 
the provision say that maintaining a preferential rate would 
unfairly benefit the rich who have already benefited from the 
reduction of the top rate on income. Furthermore, this 
simplifies the tax law and reduces the inefficiency which occurs 
when individuals try to protect ordinary income by transform 
ing it into long-term capital gains. Opponents of the provision 
have argued that eliminating the historical preference will 
discourage investment.
Unlike earlier versions that had dealt a sweeping blow to 
most deductions, the bill that emerged retained most of the 
popular deductions. Some of the major retained deductions 
are mortgage interest payments on first and second homes, 
and state and local income and property taxes. Business and 
medical expenses are allowable if they exceed 2 percent and 
7.5 percent respectively of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 
Interest on consumer loans gradually will become nondeduct- 
ible by 1991.
Tax shelters are to be eliminated. Taxpayers are no longer 
able to offset ordinary income with passive paper losses. 
Rather, they have to be active participants in partnerships in 
order to claim any losses, and even then there is a limit on the 
losses to be claimed. This provision made the reduction of the 
top rate on income from 50 percent to 33 percent more 
acceptable. Investment in oil and gas drilling operations, 
however, has been exempted. The new rules will be completely 
phased in by 1991.
With respect to businesses, the Act includes some major 
changes, the ultimate impact of which is far from certain. At 
first blush, it seems that businesses such as heavy industries 
that rely heavily on the investment tax credit will be losers, as 
will commercial real estate developers. Businesses in the
service sector and those that have been paying high effective 
tax rates would be beneficiaries under the Tax Reform Act. 
The preferential treatment currently given to oil and gas 
producers was left almost intact.
Here are some of the provisions dealing with businesses. As 
with individuals, there is a significant change in tax rates for 
businesses. The top corporate tax rate has been dropped from 
46 percent to 34 percent. There are two more brackets, 15 
percent for income up to $50,000 and 25 percent for income 
between $50,000 and $75,000. Here again, there is a 5 percent 
tax surcharge for income between $75,000 and $100,000 and 
the 34 percent rate will apply to all income when income 
exceeds $100,000. The rate on corporate net capital gains has 
been raised from 28 percent to 34 percent. This provision 
benefits those businesses that have not been taking advantage 
of the various tax breaks and are currently paying high 
effective tax rates. These changes were completely phased in 
by mid-1987.
The investment tax credit is to be repealed, and depreciation 
allowances are to be reduced. These two provisions will have 
an adverse effect on businesses investing heavily in plant and 
equipment and on real estate developers. This is a far cry from 
the 1981 tax breaks designed to favor these businesses.
Oil and gas producers have retained most of their tax 
allowances under the bill. The cause of this industry was 
helped by some influential key members of Congress, and by 
the fact that the industry is in a depressed condition. It would 
have been more difficult to plead the industry's case in the late 
1970s when windfall profit taxes on oil companies were 
popular.
In response to the public outcry over the fact that some 
large and profitable corporations have sometimes paid little or
no taxes at all, the Act includes a new minimum tax on 
businesses. The alternative minimum tax of 20 percent is 
computed after adding back many of the tax breaks to taxable 
income. The alternative minimum tax must be paid if it 
exceeds the ordinary tax. This is similar to the alternative 
minimum tax on individual earnings.
In other business-related areas, the Act extends the targeted- 
job credit for three years, and the research and development 
tax credit is also extended for three years. Tax credits allowed 
for rehabilitation of old buildings were reduced. The tax 
incentive for construction of low-income housing has been 
replaced by a generous new tax credit. Some changes in 
allowable accounting practices are expected to raise tax 
revenue. The Act also includes changes in the use of tax- 
exempt bonds and foreign tax credits.
When President Reagan directed Treasury to study tax 
overhaul in early 1984, the stated objectives were to achieve 
simplicity, fairness, efficiency, and revenue-neutrality. Sim 
plicity was given low priority soon after the overhaul process 
started because it was judged incompatible with the other 
objectives, although one could argue that having three tax 
brackets for individuals instead of fourteen is simpler. In 
chapter 2 of this volume, Joseph Stiglitz points out, however, 
that looking up one's tax in the tax tables involves little work.
The Tax Reform Act rates higher on fairness. According to 
Sheldon Danziger (chapter 6), the Act promotes horizontal 
equity because of the expanded tax base and reduced number 
of brackets. Even though it is estimated that about six million 
poor and near-poor taxpayers will be removed from the tax 
rolls, however, Danziger believes that this is not enough to 
offset the large increases in poverty and inequality that have 
taken place since 1973. In order to insure that high-income 
individuals and corporations will pay some tax regardless of
allowed deductions, the Act includes an alternative minimum 
tax. Stiglitz argues, however, that the prosperous firms will 
not be greatly affected by the minimum tax because of leasing 
provisions. Stiglitz also points out that shifting the tax burden 
from individuals to corporations ignores the fact that it is 
individuals who must bear the burden of taxation, and that it 
violates the principle of political responsibility.
Lowering the top tax rates is expected to promote efficiency 
and economic growth and to result in stronger incentives for 
increased labor market participation. Eliminating the tax 
avoidance schemes means that investments will be undertaken 
for their own merit and not for their tax implications. One 
should add that eliminating many of the investment tax 
incentives might have a negative short-term effect on capital 
formation. Joseph Minarik argues in chapter 3 that the 
reduction of tax sheltering would redirect funds from unpro 
ductive investments in tax-favored areas into more traditional 
investment fields. Furthermore, Minarik states that reduced 
tax rates and cutbacks of deductibility of interest on consumer 
loans will decrease borrowing and modestly increase saving, 
making more funds available for traditional investments. 
Laurence Kotlikoff (chapter 4) argues that a reduction in 
investment incentives results in a capital gain to owners of old 
capital, which means that older generations will benefit and 
young and middle-aged generations will be worse off because 
they must pay higher prices to acquire capital stock. Taxing 
capital gains at full rates will remove the most important form 
of tax arbitrage. Stiglitz cautions, however, that raising the 
maximum tax rate on capital gains from 20 percent to 33 
percent may have serious consequences for efficiency.
Revenue-neutrality is supposed to have been achieved by 
lowering the tax rates and expanding the tax base, and by 
raising business tax revenues while lowering tax revenues from
individuals. Estimating changes in revenue as a result of tax 
changes generally involves a great deal of guesswork. There 
are uncertainties regarding the impact of lowering marginal 
tax rates for individuals, boosting corporate profit taxes, and 
eliminating preferential treatment for capital gains, to name a 
few specific examples.
The five economists in this volume discuss the issues of 
taxation and tax reform from different points of reference.
Stiglitz provides a general theoretical background for the 
principles of taxation and the assessment of the impact of 
taxation. He discusses at length how various tax policies lead 
to tax arbitrage activities. He also points out that taxes on 
capital assets are capitalized, and that individuals bear all 
taxes. Among the principles of taxation, Stiglitz discusses the 
principle that taxpayers should know what they are paying  
"truth-in-government." Using the principles of taxation for 
guidance, Stiglitz assesses the various tax reform proposals. 
He concludes that the proposals ignore many of the principles 
of taxation. Stiglitz gives his qualified support to the intro 
duction of a value added tax, discussing both the merits and 
drawbacks of such a tax. One can use the standards employed 
by Stiglitz to evaluate the advantages and the shortcomings of 
the new tax provisions.
Minarik looks at the impact of tax reform on investment 
and growth. He points out that the roots of the recent tax 
reform drive were in the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) 
passed in 1981. Minarik argues that ERTA, with its Acceler 
ated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) and the Investment Tax 
Credit (ITC) provisions, has resulted in inconsistencies and 
revenue reductions to the government, giving the impetus to 
tax reform. Minarik further argues that, contrary to common 
wisdom, ERTA was not instrumental in stimulating invest 
ment. Investment subsidies, he contends, do not always
stimulate risk-taking and innovation. On the contrary, the 
recent subsidies have encouraged low-risk tax shelters. Mina- 
rik also argues that the elimination of tax subsidies would 
have no negative impact on investment in the long run.
In his paper, Kotlikoff discusses the impact of fiscal policy 
on intergenerational redistribution of income. He discusses 
the redistribution effects of income taxes, as well as the social 
security tax system and government borrowing. He argues 
that some of our current accounting definitions lead to "fiscal 
illusion" in the way we view the budget deficit and the 
national debt. Kotlikoff proposes redefining social security 
"taxes" as "loans" since the contributors are lending money 
to the government during their working years and receiving 
benefit payments during retirement. He would also have the 
government raise funds by levying a "head tax" with the 
promise to repay the tax plus interest as a tax credit in the 
future, instead of the present practice of selling bonds. Redef 
initions such as these, according to Kotlikoff, would lead to 
more relevant estimates of the budget deficit and the national 
debt. Consequently, one could concentrate on the impact of 
fiscal policy on intergenerational redistribution of income and 
its effect on saving, growth and economic efficiency.
Ronald Fisher (chapter 5) examines tax reform from the 
perspective of state and local governments. Since the paper 
was presented before the passage of the new tax law, it 
contained an analysis of the impact of the loss of deductibility 
of state and local taxes on those governments. Even though 
this is no longer an issue, the analysis itself stands of its own 
and the conclusions are very interesting from a theoretical 
point of view. Fisher concludes that any tax plan should be 
judged on its aggregate impact rather than its impact on 
specific sectors of the economy.
Danziger concentrates on the impact of tax reform on 
poverty and income distribution. He argues that the policy of
helping the poor via economic growth has not been successful. 
Policies such as ERTA have not had the desired effect on 
income distribution or on alleviating poverty. He stresses that 
tax reform should be and can be effectively used to aid the 
poor. Danziger introduces some statistics showing a shift 
towards greater poverty and inequality since the late seventies, 
and explores possible explanations of these phenomena. He 
then discusses the impact of the new tax law on the poor. In 
order to correct the recent trend, Danziger proposes the 
expansion of the current Earned Income Tax Credit and Per 
Capita Refundable Credit that would replace the present 
personal exemption. In discussing the merits of these propos 
als, he argues that they offer efficient options for helping the 
poor.
Like many tax changes in the past, the real impact of the 
Tax Reform Act cannot be fully predicted. There will be some 
unforeseen side effects; there will be pressures to rework some 
of the provisions. Some urgent problems will be addressed by 
tax revisions, but the bias will always be there. It is easier to 
effect a policy through tax incentives and disincentives than 
through appropriation or disappropriation. After all, this is 
how our tax system got to be the monster that it is today. 
There are still some unanswered questions with respect to the 
impact of the Act on the foreign sector and on the value of the 
dollar. The revenue-neutrality of the Act is based on estimates 
and projections that are far from perfect. The issue of the 
budget deficit has not been addressed by this Act.
It is hoped that this volume will provide some insight into 
the complexity of the world of tax reform. History has shown 
us that tax reform is an ongoing process and it does not end 




Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Princeton University
Each year, as April 15 approaches, we are forced to spend 
some moments thinking about our income tax system. There 
is, and has been, a great deal of dissatisfaction with our 
system. There is a general consensus that others are paying 
less than their fair share.
Popular concern has focused on the inequities and complex 
ities of the system. Economists' concerns have been centered 
not only on these matters, but also on the inefficiencies to 
which our tax system allegedly gives rise.
The dissatisfaction has been so great that President Reagan 
made tax reform one of the highest priority items in his 
agenda for his second term. In spite of the importance he 
attached to it, there has not yet been a tax reform bill as of this 
writing. But by now, the outlines of what is likely to pass  
and there is a consensus that a bill will pass has emerged. It 
is not the tax reform bill that President Reagan had hoped 
would lead to the Second American Revolution. It is certainly 
not the tax reform bill about which economists had dreamed.
Why and to what extent do I think the bill which is likely to 
emerge will represent a failure of the movement to reform our 
income tax system? What lessons can we learn from this 
seeming failure of reform? What implications does it have for 
how the government should raise the revenues required to 
finance its operations? These are the questions which I shall 
address this evening. First, however, I should like to review
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some of the economists' traditional principles concerning tax 
design and some facts concerning the consequence of a tax 
system.
Some Basic Propositions Concerning the Effects of 
Taxation
There are five basic facts concerning the consequences of a 
tax system I should like to mention.
First, the inefficiencies associated with a tax system what 
economists' call the dead weight loss of the tax system are 
associated with the marginal tax rates, the extra tax an 
individual pays for the extra dollar of income. This determines 
the extent to which the tax system distorts the decision of 
whether to work more, to retire later, to stay in school longer, 
or to save more. 1 Our tax system has been criticized for its 
high marginal tax rates, though the levels today are far lower 
than they were some years ago.
Second, any tax system that taxes different incomes  
whether income to different individuals or income received in 
different forms opens itself to the possibility of what we call 
tax arbitrage, the attempt to change the form in which 
transactions occur, or to engage in transactions the purpose of 
which is to reduce total tax liabilities. Let me illustrate.
Because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than 
ordinary income, there is an incentive for individuals to 
attempt to reap their returns in the form of capital gains. In an 
inflationary period, real estate values are often much higher 
than the depreciated basis of an asset. If an individual who is 
at a low income tax bracket sells his real estate to a high 
bracket individual, the former will have to pay a tax on his 
capital gain;2 but this is more than offset by the advantages 
arising from the higher depreciation allowances accruing to
11
the high tax individual. 3 In these circumstances, the tax system 
thus gives rise to an incentive to churn assets.
Perhaps the most notorious tax arbitrage activities growing 
out of the 1981 Tax Bill were those associated with Safe 
Harbor Leasing. Firms that did not have the income against 
which to offset their accelerated depreciation allowances and 
investment tax credits arranged for other firms with surplus 
income in quite different lines of business nominally to 
purchase machines for them; they would then lease the 
machines back. Thus Chrysler might arrange to have its 
machines purchased by, say, Exxon. But it was a pure paper 
charade. Chrysler would have purchased the machine by 
borrowing, say, 80 percent from a bank, and putting up 20 
percent of its own capital. Chrysler might now pay Exxon 20 
percent as the first lease payment, and Exxon would borrow 
the remaining 80 percent from the same bank. Exxon has done 
nothing but sign some papers. In fact, the tremendous tax 
advantages which would accrue to Exxon mean that it would 
be willing to pay a considerable amount, perhaps enough to 
relieve Chrysler of most of its earlier payments.4 Notice that it 
is the difference in tax bracket between Chrysler and Exxon 
which provides the motivation for these transactions.
These tax arbitrage activities have several consequences. 
First, they make it difficult to ascertain the true incidence of 
the tax structure who really pays the taxes. Thus, there has 
been considerable publicity given to the failure of several of 
the major American corporations to pay any taxes in recent 
years, largely because of these leasing arrangements. But in 
most cases, the companies, like Exxon and GE, who "buy" 
the machine and lease it nominally taking the tax advan 
tages are not the true beneficiaries: rather it is the companies 
in dire straits (Chrysler, for example) to whom more than 85 
percent of the benefits accrue. The result is little different from
12
what it would be if the government made the investment tax 
credit cashable (that is, a company with zero income would 
receive a check from the government); or if the government 
allowed individuals to defer taking advantage of the tax credit 
until the firm had a positive income, but credited the firm with 
interest for the deferment (as most economists believe should 
be done).
(Similar issues arise in interpreting who gets the benefits 
from the provisions of tax exemption of interest on state and 
local bonds. A significant fraction of those benefits accrue to 
the municipalities, not to the individuals, who earn lower 
returns on those bonds than they would on taxable bonds.)
Furthermore, tax arbitrage activities undo some of the 
distortions which would otherwise be associated with the tax 
system. In the example given above, in the absence of leasing, 
the marginal cost of investment for a firm with no income 
against which to offset its investment tax credit and its 
accelerated depreciation allowances (Chrysler) is greater than 
for a company with a high income (Exxon). It is questionable 
whether, as a matter of national policy, we would wish to 
introduce discriminatory legislation of that form. Leasing 
undoes this distortion.
At the same time, tax arbitrage often does lead to distor 
tions in economic activities. While pure tax arbitrage has no 
effect other than to induce certain paper transactions, that is, 
the only dead weight loss is the transaction costs, much of the 
activity which I loosely refer to as tax arbitrage is not pure. To 
take advantage of the special provisions for capital gains, 
individuals may be induced to purchase real estate (because it 
is easier to obtain loans against property, and thus take 
advantage of the differential treatment between the full de- 
ductibility of interest and the 40 percent taxation of long-term 
capital gains).5
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Finally, these tax arbitrage activities probably imply that 
the true degree of progressivity of the tax system is less than 
the nominal degree of progressivity. Wealthier individuals are 
in a position to take advantage of these tax avoidance 
activities (and have a greater motive to do so). This is, in fact, 
one of the reasons for the widespread dissatisfaction with our 
current tax system.
The third basic fact concerning the effects of taxation is a 
simple and seemingly obvious one, but one which has been 
obfuscated in the current debate: it is individuals who bear all 
taxes. Corporations may pay taxes, but ultimately, the burden 
of all taxation must rest upon individuals the managers or 
workers of the corporation, the shareholders, or the custom 
ers.
The fourth basic fact concerning the assessment of the 
effects of taxation is that the effects of any tax cannot be 
assessed in isolation: it is the impact of the whole tax structure 
which is relevant. This is true with respect to an evaluation of 
both the efficiency and equity consequences. Thus, the mar 
ginal tax rate which is relevant for distorting individual 
behavior is not just the rate imposed by the federal income 
tax, but the total marginal rate, taking into account social 
security taxes (and benefits), state income taxes, and sales 
taxes.
The final basic fact that is particularly important in assess 
ing the consequences of tax changes is that taxes on capital 
assets are capitalized; that is, the price of existing assets 
reflects future anticipated tax changes. Thus, if there are 
particular assets which are taxed at higher (or lower) rates 
than other assets, it is not the current owners who bear the 
burden of the tax (or receive the benefits), but the owners of 
the asset at the time the tax was imposed (or the favorable 
treatment granted). 6 As a consequence, changes in the tax
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treatment of particular capital assets may have enormous 
effects on current owners of assets. Moreover, removing the 
favorable treatment accorded some class of assets does not 
necessarily remove the inequity created when the favorable 
treatment was granted, but may compound the inequities: for 
the current owner, who is hurt by the removal of the favorable 
treatment, may well not be the same individual who owned it 
at the time the favorable treatment was granted. Conversely, 
removing the discriminatory treatment on some class of assets 
may not provide compensation for those who incurred losses 
at the time the discriminatory treatment was imposed.7
Principles of Taxation
In evaluating the desirability of a tax system, economists 
have traditionally invoked five principles:
A good tax system should be equitable, first vis-a-vis its 
treatment of individuals in roughly similar economic straits 
(the principle of horizontal equity)., and second, vis-a-vis its 
treatment of individuals in different economic circumstances 
(the principle of vertical equity). There is one aspect of these 
principles of fairness to which I would like to call attention: 
the difficulty of ascertaining what an individual's fair contri 
bution is, and of devising ways of implementing whatever 
principle one adopts within a legal code. There is a widespread 
belief that income is the appropriate basis of taxation, a good 
surrogate for ability to pay. Yet virtually all economists and 
most noneconomists would agree that income should not be 
measured on a daily, or weekly basis. Most economists would 
argue that the appropriate time unit is the individual's lifetime 
income; that is, the government should not penalize those 
individuals whose incomes have fluctuated over their life time, 
as our progressive tax structure does. But a lifetime income 
tax is, in fact, equivalent to a consumption tax (with appro-
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priate treatment of bequests and inheritances). Thus, if one 
believes in a lifetime income tax, one should exempt interest 
income, which can be viewed as a discriminatory tax on those 
who prefer to consume goods later on in their lives.
Third, a good tax system should "minimize" the distortions 
it introduces (the principle of efficiency).
A fourth principle is that a good tax system should not 
impose undue administrative costs, either directly, or indirect 
ly, on the parties being taxed.
This leads me to the fifth principle of a good tax system, one 
about which there is not universal agreement: a good tax 
system is one in which individuals know what they are paying. 
I sometimes refer to this as the principle of political responsi 
bility. Just as we believe it is only fair that lenders tell their 
potential borrowers what the interest rate they charge is, and 
that manufacturers of food tell their potential customers what 
ingredients are contained in the packages they sell, so too it is 
only right that the government should tell its citizens what 
each, individually, is contributing to the support of public 
services. The reason that I say there is not universal agreement 
on this principle is that just as lenders often argue that the 
truth-in-lending law just confuses potential borrowers, scaring 
them off from doing what they intuitively know is in their own 
best interests, so, too, some politicians are concerned that 
truth-in-government legislation would simply confuse tax 
payers and induce them to vote for smaller budgets than they 
otherwise would, leading to a cutback in important public 
services.
There are, of course, important trade-offs among these 
principles. A more progressive ("vertically equitable") tax 
system is likely to have a greater dead weight loss.
Some of the distinctions we introduce into our tax system, 
e.g., concerning the deductibility of medical expenses are there
16
because we believe that they increase the equity of the tax 
system; those who have had to pay large medical expenses 
have a lower ability to pay than those who have not. But at the 
same time, they introduce further inequities. There are two 
types of error in any tax system: some individuals (of a given 
income) who should have had their taxes reduced (because of 
their special circumstances) do not get a tax reduction; and 
some individuals who should not have had their taxes reduced 
do get a tax reduction. If we tighten rules for medical 
deductibility, more individuals who should get a tax reduction 
do not; but fewer individuals who should not have gotten a 
tax reduction do. There is a trade-off in the two types of error.
There is, moreover, a trade-off between simplicity and 
equity. To make fine distinctions (e.g., between those who do 
or do not get a medical deduction) requires a complex law; to 
simply disallow deductions is simple, but may be unfair.
An Assessment of the Current Reforms
With these principles and facts in mind, let us review the 
direction that tax reform appears to be taking in order to 
ascertain the extent to which it conforms with these basic 
principles.
The major hallmark of the tax reform is the reduction in the 
top tax brackets from 50 percent, to 33 percent.8
The tax reform bill has not gone as far in base broadening 
as the advocates of reform would have liked. While only 
medical expenses in excess of 7.5 percent will be deductible, 
the far more important area of employer-provided health 
benefits has been left untouched. While state sales taxes will 
not be deductible, the more significant state income and local 
property taxes remain deductible.
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In retaining the provisions for the deductibility of mortgage 
interest, the government probably has undone much of its 
effort to reduce the tax deductibility of interest; individuals 
will simply substitute home equity loans for car loans as they 
were already doing before the new tax law. Again, the 
provision will have some impact, for example, on those 
individuals who itemize, but do not own a home; how 
significant a group this is, and whether this is a particular 
group which should be penalized, are questions we should ask 
ourselves.
Capital gains will be taxed at full rates. This has one distinct 
advantage; it eliminates one of the most important sources of 
tax arbitrage. But the raising of the tax rate on capital gains by 
more than half, from the current effective maximum rate of 20 
percent to 33 percent, may have serious consequences for 
economic efficiency. Moreover, most economists would argue 
that it is real capital gains, not nominal capital gains, which 
should be taxed.
The major effort of the government in simplifying the tax 
system has been to replace the system of many tax brackets 
with three tax brackets. This, I think, is an inconsequential 
simplification. There is little work associated with looking up 
one's tax in the tax tables. In other respects, the new tax law 
may actually make life more complicated.
One of the more popular proposals for dealing with the 
inequities which will remain within our tax system, given the 
seeming inability to redesign the tax structure to eliminate the 
major "loopholes," is to impose a minimum tax. There is, 
again, less to this than meets the eye. As we have noted, many 
of the prosperous firms who pay little tax do so because of 
leasing provisions. Forcing these firms to pay a minimum tax 
will not seriously disadvantage them because most of the 
benefits of the leasing provisions accrue to the less well-off
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firms. Thus, the minimum tax may actually work more to the 
disadvantage of the less well off, and will increase the distor 
tions associated with our tax system.
Most of the currently discussed tax reform proposals entail 
shifting the burden of taxation from the individual to the 
corporation; this violates the principle of political responsibil 
ity. The proponents of this either simply ignore the fact that it 
is individuals who must bear the burden of taxation, or are 
engaged in a political swindle: precisely because it is not easy 
to recognize who bears the burden makes such taxes politi 
cally desirable. (There is a third reason for the corporation 
tax, to which I shall return later: the belief that it is share 
holders and managers who bear the burden, but direct income 
taxation is an ineffective way of getting revenue from these 
individuals.)
This list of criticisms is not meant to be exhaustive, but 
merely to be indicative of the extent to which current propos 
als ignore some of the basic principles of taxation.
The Reasons for the Failure of Tax Reform
Indeed, though it may be too soon to make a final 
pronouncement, I am willing to venture that at least from 
the perspective of most economists the tax bill which finally 
emerges from Congress will be a failure; it will fall short of a 
major reform dreamed of a little more than two years ago. 
What are the reasons for this failure? I want to suggest three 
contributing factors.
First, economists have failed to convince the public and 
those involved in political decision making of the appropri 
ateness of their models. This is partly because some of the 
models are, in fact, inappropriate, and it is hard for the 
nonspecialist to distinguish among those which are and those
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which are not. This has left the politician in the position of 
selectively using economists' arguments: when they wish to 
reduce tax rates (to reduce the degree of progressivity), they 
refer to supply-side effects and economic efficiency; when they 
wish to subsidize smokestack America, they ignore the econ 
omists' advice concerning the desirability of investment 
neutrality.
Let me give some examples of where the models that are 
predominately in use among economists seem, at best, ques 
tionable. Perhaps nowhere is there more evidence than in their 
analysis of the capital market and corporation taxation. Most 
economists' models assume that firms can borrow freely at the 
market rate of interest, and this assumption has lead econo 
mists to focus on the effect of taxation on the marginal cost of 
capital. This effect is undoubtedly important. But many firms 
face credit rationing and are unable to raise funds on equity 
markets (or it is prohibitively expensive for them to do so).9 
They are thus concerned with their after-tax resources, i.e., 
their average rate of taxation.
Equalizing marginal tax rates and equalizing average tax 
rates are two quite different matters, when investment patterns 
differ. One kind of neutrality does not imply the other kind of 
neutrality.
The economists' traditional tirade against IRAs misses the 
point that most individuals do not have easy access to 
borrowing, and may be induced to increase their savings by 
this kind of "gimmick." The evidence to date is mixed: 
wealthier individuals are more likely to take advantage of 
IRAs, but there is little evidence of the widespread tax 
arbitrage that economic theory would predict.
Indeed, even economists have been somewhat schizophrenic 
in their analyses of the effects of taxation within their tradi-
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tional neoclassical models. Their models, when strictly ap 
plied, simply fail to explain important aspects of individual 
and firm behavior. At crucial junctures, they have resorted to 
ad hoc assumptions in order to "resolve" what would appear 
to be, within the confines of their model, inexplicable paradox 
es. Let me mention a few instances. In some earlier work 
(Stiglitz 1983, 1985), I took the economists' standard models 
of the tax system and of the capital market (perfect capital 
markets) and showed that there were tax arbitrage activities 
which could completely eliminate all taxes on capital, and 
indeed, if carried far enough, all taxes on earned income as 
well. I also showed that the optimal behavior of the corpora 
tion entailed it never paying dividends (this has come to be 
called the dividend paradox); there are tax preferred ways of 
distributing funds from the corporate to the unincorporated 
sector (Stiglitz 1973). (I also showed that there were no 
efficiency losses from the corporation income tax for a firm, 
facing no uncertainty provided the firm pursues an optimal 
financial policy.) (Stiglitz 1973, 1976.) I do not necessarily 
believe the conclusions of these studies; I do not believe that 
the corporation tax is nondistortionary. I certainly do not 
believe that individuals have eliminated all taxes through tax 
arbitrage. But what these models show is how woefully 
inadequate the traditional economists' models are for analyz 
ing the consequences of taxes. This is not to say that some of 
the effects, which they have emphasized are not important. 
But I suspect that many politicians, not thoroughly indoctri 
nated into the economists' way of thinking, smell, if not a rat, 
at least a little mouse; they suspect something is wrong with 
the model, but are obviously not in a position to determine 
what it is.
Political decision makers may also be somewhat confused 
by the seeming vagaries of the profession. A quarter century 
ago, economists like Nicky Kaldor and Milton Friedman
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could write, quite convincingly, of the desirability of the 
consumption tax based on considerations of economic effi 
ciency, because it reduced the number of distortions. Then 
economists, following a rediscovery of Frank Ramsey's classic 
paper of the late 1920s (Ramsey 1927), realized that two small 
distortions might be better than one large distortion (one 
could not simply count distortions), and derived conditions 
under which an interest income tax would be economically 
efficient. But Ramsey had conducted his analysis on the 
assumption that there was no progressive income tax. When 
this was recognized, the presumption in favor of no interest 
income tax was restored. 10
Following this confusion, economists have switched their 
arguments for a consumption tax from a focus on economic 
efficiency to one on administrative simplicity: much of the 
complexity of the tax code, and most of the tax avoidance 
activities, are centered around the taxation of capital. (See 
Bradford 1986.)
There are further, quite convincing arguments for the 
abolition of the taxation of the return to capital. We alluded 
to one of these earlier: the belief that the appropriate time 
period for taxation is the individual's life time.
Moreover, much of the lost revenue from the abolition of 
the taxation of capital is income which, under an ideal tax 
system, would not be taxed anyway: nominal (as opposed to 
real) returns, including nominal capital gains. With real 
interest rates traditionally at less than 1 or 2 percent, the loss 
of revenue from the taxation of the real return to capital may 
be negligible (although the returns to risk-taking may not be 
insignificant).
On the one hand, one might contend that the abolition of 
the capital tax hardly constitutes a "solution" to the admin-
22
istrative problem of taxing capital; on the other hand, if the 
revenues lost are not too great, if one believes that it is lifetime 
income which is the appropriate basis of taxation, and if much 
of the complexity and most tax avoidance activity are indeed 
associated with capital taxation, elimination of capital taxa 
tion becomes an attractive possibility. Yet this is not the route 
that the current tax reform has taken, largely because of the 
belief, whether mistaken or not, that it would be, or would 
appear to be, inequitable.
This brings me to the second explanation for the failure of 
tax reform. Our tax system is an important forum within 
which our national values become stated. In other words, 
what is at issue is more than just economics. We have seen this 
repeatedly.
The Jeffersonian ideal of a country of small farmers may be 
inappropriate for a modern industrial society, but we still 
believe that individuals should have the right to own their own 
house, to have an equity claim, so to speak, in America. I am 
not unsympathetic with this view, as contrary as it may seem 
to economists' traditional obsession with the neutrality be 
tween rental and owner-occupied housing. (As an aside, 
economists' modelling of the differences between these eco 
nomic arrangements leaves much to be desired; the central 
issues of moral hazard, the incentive effects of maintenance of 
one's own house, are, in this work, completely ignored.) 
House ownership has, I suspect, important effects on indivi 
duals' views of themselves and their relationship to their 
society; and it may have positively beneficial effects on voting 
behavior, and hence on the nature of local communities. (See 
Stiglitz 1986.)
The positive encouragement of ESOP plans (by which 
individuals obtain an equity share in the firms for whom they 
work) and IRAs can be justified on similar terms.
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Charity has always played an important role in the Amer 
ican ideal and the decentralized provision of public goods 
encouraged by the charitable contributions has had, overall, a 
tremendously positive influence on our society. Without its 
privately supported medical foundations and educational 
institutions, America would not be what it is today. Thus it is 
not surprising that the charitable deduction has been defended 
with such vehemence, and retained.
But once one recognizes the desirability of retaining the 
charitable deductions, it is hard to eliminate completely the 
deduction for local and state taxes, part of which perform 
functions not dissimilar to charity: the compulsory contribu 
tion of an elderly individual to support a local public school 
system in similar in many ways to his voluntary gift to support 
a local private university. 11
The third reason for the failure of tax reform is related to 
simple political economy considerations: there are vested 
interests who are willing to fight quite hard to retain the 
special provisions which benefit them. Some of this may be 
put down to simple greed. But I have increasingly become 
convinced that there is frequently more to it than that: we live 
in a complex world, where the consequences of various 
policies are hard to ascertain. Those who are in an industry 
know the industry better than anyone else, except perhaps the 
economists who have made a study of them; but for reasons I 
have already alluded to, the economists' model often appears 
to be suspect. Thus, economists might argue that risk markets 
work almost perfectly, but the lobbyist for the oil and gas 
industry may make a convincing case that this is not true, and 
that unless special tax provisions are given, the tax structure 
will adversely affect this important industry.
Moreover, as I have also argued, there is more at stake than 
just efficiency considerations: there are values. The housing
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industry may concede that mortgage deducibility is not 
neutral, but argue that is precisely why it is good.
The problem is to distinguish between legitimate argu 
ments, and those that are self-serving.
The political economy problems associated with taxation 
should not come as a surprise. Indeed, one can interpret the 
restrictions imposed on taxation within the Constitution as a 
recognition of them. The writers of the Constitution were well 
aware that certain forms of taxation could be used to discrim 
inate against different groups, and to favor other groups. The 
South, afraid that the more populous North would impose 
export taxes, to the South's disadvantage, succeeded in mak 
ing such taxes unconstitutional. But they failed to recognize 
that in a general equilibrium model, export taxes and import 
duties are equivalent, and the North was successful in impos 
ing these taxes with differential burdens on the South.
The writers of the Constitution also imposed a uniformity 
clause, though the recent decision of the Supreme Court in 
upholding the constitutionality of the exemption of North 
Slope oil from the windfall profits tax decimated what little 
force was left in this important provision.
As most of you may be aware, the Constitution also 
originally prohibited direct taxes (such as an income tax) on a 
basis other than per head. Whether they intuited the kinds of 
problems that we now face may be debated. But certainly the 
writers of the amendment allowing the income tax seem, at 
least in retrospect, to have been insufficiently aware of the 
abuses to which the power to impose that form of taxation is 
subject.
Where Do We Go From Here?
What lessons are there to be learned from this failure of tax 
reform? Where do we go from here?
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First, it appears to me that we have asked too much of our 
tax system. By asking more, we may have gotten less. We have 
been overly ambitious in our attempts to redistribute income 
through the tax system, and as a result, we have provided 
incentives for massive tax avoidance. We have attempted to 
address the energy crisis and other social ills with our tax 
system; from an administrative perspective, this may not be 
unreasonable. It may be cheaper, for example, to subsidize the 
rehabilitation of our inner cities through the tax system than 
to set up a grants program. But the overall loss in faith in the 
equity of our system of financing public services may not be 
worth the savings in administrative costs.
Second, I think one can safely conclude that a major 
revamping of our income tax system appears unlikely for the 
foreseeable future. It should be borne in mind that there are 
significant costs associated with continually revising our tax 
system; individuals find it difficult to plan for the future, and 
this, in itself, may be a discouragement to investment. Given 
that a general tax reform appears unlikely, the only way to 
reduce the inefficiencies and inequities associated with the tax 
system is to reduce the amounts of revenue that we seek to 
collect from it. Moreover, reducing the tax rates reduces 
incentives to engage in tax avoidance activities. 12
This leads me to a qualified support for the introduction of 
a value added (consumption-based) tax. Most economists 
have been suspicious of such a tax because it is equivalent to a 
proportional income (or consumption) tax (depending on the 
specific rules of the tax); thus the introduction of such a tax, 
in effect, serves to reduce the overall progressivity to the tax 
system. Moreover, it introduces an additional administrative 
apparatus. Why, economists have asked, have two adminis 
trative systems, when one can do just as well with one?
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What this argument ignores is the fact that there are also 
administrative costs associated with tax avoidance activities. 
Thus, while it might pay an individual to attempt to avoid a 20 
percent income tax, it might not pay him to engage in 
activities to avoid a ten percent income tax, and a separate set 
of activities to avoid a 10 percent value added tax. Moreover, 
the way these taxes are collected, in fact, means that there are 
different tax avoidance possibilities in each. Thus, the principle 
of multiple nets suggests that one might obtain a more 
equitable tax system, with indeed lower overall administrative 
costs per dollar raised, by having two separate systems. This 
principle of multiple nets can be used to justify two other 
aspects of our tax code. If we had a well-functioning estate 
and gift tax system, then a consumption tax, combined with 
such an estate and gift tax, might well be desirable. But our 
gift and estate taxes are far from perfect. We can think of our 
present tax system, which exempts much of life cycle savings 
(housing, IRAs, pensions, etc.) as an attempt to capture the 
returns to some of the capital which escape the estate gift tax 
net. The corporation tax may be justified on similar grounds.
I qualify my support for these proposals for a value added 
tax for two reasons. First, there will be pressures to have a 
nonuniform value added tax. The more differentiated the tax, 
the greater the administrative problems, and the more likely 
we are to wind up in the same quagmire that we now find 
ourselves in with respect to the income tax. Second, there is 
concern that political leaders will take advantage of consumer 
ignorance, of their inability to ascertain their true tax liabili 
ties, and that the imposition of the value added tax will 
provide a mechanism for an expansion of the scale of the 
public sector.
The growing recognition of what I call the "political 
economy problems," what the popular press refers to as the
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lack of restraint on government expenditures and govern 
ment's propensity to dispense favors to special interest groups, 
and what economists might loosely describe as the lack of 
optimality of political equilibrium 13 (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 
1980 or Stiglitz 1986), has given rise to a movement for 
constitutional restrictions on the level of government expen 
ditures and the size of the deficit.
Note that the change in the constitutional restrictions on 
the set of admissible taxes may be closely tied to concerns 
about the size of the public sector. Popular support for 
government expenditure programs may be much greater if one 
believes that someone else (or no one) pays for it. With a 
progressive income tax, or a corporation tax, one can be 
mislead into believing that it is the "rich" or "corporations" 
which pay. Many of our current programs might not be 
supported if we had to finance them out of a head tax. 14
That is one of the reasons I have emphasized earlier the 
importance of the principle of political responsibility in tax 
systems.
I have mixed feelings about these proposals for a constitu 
tional amendment. The dangers of the loss of flexibility from 
a constitutional amendment must be balanced against the 
possible advantages in ameliorating the problems with which 
we have been concerned here. Moreover, I am not convinced 
that the proposals I have seen will deal adequately with the 
problem. Restrictions in deficits, in the absences of an ade 
quate capital budget, give rise to incentives to sell government 
assets such as the sale of offshore oil and gas leases during the 
past few years merely to balance the books, regardless of 
long-term costs to the American taxpayer. Restrictions on 
government expenditures give rise to the use of tax expendi 
tures, loan guarantees, and other devices, regardless of their 
merits relative to direct expenditures. Nor do the standard
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proposals do anything to address directly the abuses of our 
tax system, i.e., the structure problems which are the center of 
concern of the tax reform movement.
There are no easy solutions. As an educator, I have a 
strong belief in the value of information. That is why I think 
it important to have some truth-in-government legislation, 
where the government details the tax burden imposed on each 
individual. 15 I also think this kind of forum you have been 
holding here this year on taxation, the objective of which is to 
increase the general understanding of the effects of our tax 
system, is vital. I am pleased and honored to have been invited 
to address you this evening, and to participate with you in 
these endeavors.
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NOTES
1. The marginal tax rate determines the magnitude of the substitution effect 
(at a given level of welfare, which is related to how the individual trades off 
consumption and leisure, or present consumption and future consump 
tion), the average tax rate determines the magnitude of the income effect. 
The total effect is the sum of the two. The inefficiency associated with the 
tax system is associated with the substitution effect. The absence of a 
significant total effect (with substitution and income effects offsetting each 
other) has often been confused with the absence of any distortionary effect.
2. And there may possibly be a tax at ordinary rates on the recapture of his 
depreciation.
3. Even taking into account recapture. See Stiglitz (1985).
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4. This description oversimplifies by ignoring the important risks which 
Exxon might face in the presence of a default on the part of Chrysler. One 
of the main consequences of the Safe Harbor Provisions were to reduce 
those risks.
5. In addition, the "at risk" provisions are more favorable in real estate.
6. Or more accurately, at the time that it became believed that such a tax 
would be imposed (or such a favorable treatment would be granted).
7. Or more accurately, at the time that it became believed that such a tax 
would be imposed (or such a favorable treatment would be granted).
8. The legislated top rate is 28 percent, but as individuals' incomes 
increase, there is a reduction in their exemptions (and standard deductions) 
so that the effective rate is 33 percent.
9. There are good reasons for this, based on theories of imperfect 
information. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) and Greenwald, Stiglitz, 
and Weiss (1984).
10. See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). More accurately, there are conditions 
under which there should be an interest income tax, and other conditions 
under which there should be an interest income subsidy. It appears difficult 
to ascertain empirically which of these conditions actually prevail.
11. The minimum tax may similarly be viewed as desirable, not because it 
actually increases equity, or because it increases efficiency, but because it 
represents a statement of values, that is, the principle that every one above 
a certain income level should pay at least 20 percent of his income to the 
government, and it should be transparent that he does so.
12. Though much of the cost of those activities may be the fixed costs 
associated with learning about how to avoid taxes. If that is the case, then a 
reduction in tax rates may not reduce tax avoidance activities substantially.
13. Or, indeed, the absence of an equilibrium (see Arrow 1951).
14. Similarly, the scope for redistribution at the local and state level is 
much different than at the national level. The extent of distribution which 
well emerges if responsibility for welfare is placed at the state and local 
level differs from that which will emerge if the locus of responsibility is at 
the national level.
15. There are obvious difficulties, because not even economists can agree 
on who pays the corporation tax. But these ambiguities can be noted in the 
"information" sheet sent to each individual.
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Rating Tax Reform 
on Growth
Joseph J. Minarik 
The Urban Institute
Let me begin this lecture with a hypothetical question: 
suppose that you were confronted with two alternative lottery 
tickets, one with relatively attractive odds of a small prize and 
the other with longer odds but a larger prize.
How would you evaluate the alternatives? What would 
influence you in making your choice?
Would you place a bet only if your preferred alternative 
were made available, or would you take a chance either way?
I raise these questions because they are much like the 
choices among alternative investments that many businesses 
must make. Further, the tax system can make business choices 
more like either the high-percentage, low-stakes bet or the 
low-percentage, high-stakes bet.
Of course, the most fundamental elements of the tax system 
are very much on the bargaining table right now, in a process 
that has come to be known as tax reform. This process is 
highly controversial, with conflicting claims of paradise and 
inferno as the likely result. Nowhere have the claims and 
counterclaims been more frequent and more strident than in 
the field of business taxation. Some business spokesmen have 
seen tax reform as a step toward a more efficient and neutral 
allocation of investment capital among sectors, leading to 
faster growth and greater productivity. Advocates of other 
firms, however, have been particularly adamant that tax 
reform will choke off investment and lead to stagnation.
Which side is right? Is either side right?
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Even in this environment of uncertainty, we can say some 
things about what a sound tax policy would be, guided by 
basic principles and by recent economic history. The stakes 
are high, and so this inquiry is well worth the effort.
I will begin this lecture by setting the scene for the tax 
reform debate with the tax cuts of 1981. We will see that this 
law's attempts to stimulate growth caused much of the 
impetus for tax reform today. We will also see how today's 
proposals for reform of the individual income tax largely 
determine the outlines of proposals for business tax reform, 
and that these outlines lead to much of the opposition on 
grounds of investment and growth. Finally, we will examine 
the track record of the current law on investment, and 
consider the prospects for investment under distinctly dif 
ferent tax rules.
Tax Reform Yesterday
Several years ago, an imaginative pundit wrote a mostly 
(but not totally) tongue-in-cheek piece called "The Ten Com 
mandments of Tax Reform." Commandment number one (as 
I recall) was a dictum apparently well known to policymakers, 
instinctively if not consciously: "Whatever you want to do, 
call it'reform.'"*
On this basis, it is not surprising that we have had a lot of 
tax "reform" in recent years.
It is not a huge logical leap from the nearly universal cries 
that our tax system today is in desperate need of "reform" to
*(I confess that, with the best of intentions and calling upon the most knowledgeable people 
in the field, I cannot document this article that is so vividly etched upon my memory. Perhaps 
someone who hears or reads this lecture will be able to help me along. Or in the best of all 
possible outcomes, perhaps I only imagined it. Then I would have only nine commandments 
to go, and I could write the article myself)
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a realization that the many recent "reforms" somehow missed 
their mark. The proof of this idea is no farther away than the 
last major piece of tax "reform" legislation, and indeed the 
root of our current budgetary crisis: the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, commonly identified by its acronym of 
ERTA.
ERTA was motivated, for the most part, by two strongly 
held beliefs of its early champions: that the level of individual 
marginal income tax rates was so high as to deter work and 
saving; and that the tax treatment of business investments in 
depreciable capital, the carriers of technological progress and 
the instruments of growth, was so rigorous as to choke off 
such investments. Obviously, with an agenda such as that, tax 
reform was quite simple; cutting individual income tax rates is 
intellectually trivial, and accelerating business growth can be 
(and was) done in simple ways.
Of course, the political salvation of ERTA was that it did 
not hurt anyone (with very few exceptions, to be discussed 
later). ERTA was the tax equivalent of throwing money at 
problems roughly $747 billion over five years, to be specific. 
Roughly two-thirds of this tax cut went to individuals, and 
about one-third to corporations. With an uplifting theme like 
"reform," and all that money to go around, who could be 
opposed?
The problem, as we now see so clearly, is that ERTA both 
gave away money that we as a nation did not have, and that 
it did so in an inconsistent manner. On the question of raw 
dollars, ERTA opened a budget chasm that was to be filled 
with future unspecified budget cuts. The nation took the cash 
with a smile, and only recoiled when the spending-cut bills 
came due. Without the spending cuts that a now-informed 
nation refuses to make, the tax cuts are unjustifiable.
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Equally troublesome for tax policy, however, are the inter 
nal inconsistencies that ERTA created. Though allegedly 
evenhanded because of equal percentage tax rate cuts across 
the board, ERTA in fact shortchanged the poor and near- 
poor. The percentage tax rate cut did little for millions of 
low-income persons whose personal exemptions and zero 
bracket amounts, badly eroded by five years of rapid inflation, 
were left to continue to erode over five more years.
A further and more structural inconsistency of the post- 
1981 tax law was demonstrated by the enactment and heavy 
use of safe-harbor tax leasing. ERTA, in its zeal to encourage 
business investment in depreciable capital, including the Ac 
celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). ACRS made tax 
depreciation extraordinarily generous so generous, in fact, 
that many firms found that the early-year deductions, in 
combination with the investment tax credit (ITC), completely 
wiped out their tax liabilities, with still more deductions left 
over. These deductions were temporarily wasted unless the 
investing firm had income from other sources against which 
the deductions could be offset. This gave an important 
advantage to large, highly profitable firms, who could use all 
of the their tax advantages from depreciation; smaller firms, 
especially new firms with little or no taxable income, would 
have to raise more cash to undertake investments (because 
they could not enjoy an immediate tax reduction from depre 
ciation and the ITC), and so such firms might choose to 
postpone investments until they could use the tax breaks.
The Reagan administration foresaw this problem, and 
chose to remedy it by allowing safe-harbor leases paper 
transactions through which firms that could not use their full 
depreciation deductions and ITCs could sell their assets to 
more profitable firms that could use the tax benefits. The 
public outcry that followed the "buying and selling of tax 
breaks," however, with the spectacle of banks, insurance
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companies, and General Electric claiming deductions and 
credits for other firms' investments and paying no income tax 
on billions of dollars of profits, caused the Congress to 
promptly reverse its field and repeal the leasing law. Congress 
did not, of course, repeal the ACRS and ITC provisions that 
motivated safe-harbor leasing; so while the symptom has been 
cured, the disease remains. New symptoms have appeared, 
including mergers involving firms with unused reservoirs of 
tax deductions and credits.
Both the internal inconsistencies and the revenue inadequa 
cies of the post-1981 tax law have motivated the current drive 
for tax reform. The role of the internal inconsistencies is 
obvious; the President and all other tax reform advocates cite 
the need for tax relief for the poor and an end to over- 
generous depreciation. (In the case of the President, of course, 
this is quite an about-face from four years ago.) The revenue 
motivation for tax reform is perhaps less obvious, however; 
the President insists that any tax reform be revenue neutral, 
and all other reform proposals claim to follow that line 
(though some fall short). Nonetheless, many advocates of 
these proposals acknowledge that a tax increase to narrow the 
deficit is inevitable. The motivation for reform is that the 
current tax law, laden as it is with internal inconsistencies, 
could not provide substantial additional revenues without 
harmful side effects. If the President stands in the way of a tax 
increase but would welcome tax reform, it would be wise to 
get the first half of the job out of the way. Then when the need 
for revenue becomes even more apparent, possibly in a crisis, 
the necessary revenue tool will be ready.
Tax Reform Today
The new tax reform proposals are different from the 1981 
model in that they cannot give any money away. They are
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further different in that they address the issue that was the 
heart of the tax reform debate for decades before the 1981 
distraction: the definition of the tax base. In response to 
complaints from the household sector that the income tax is 
unfair, the President and others propose to repeal numerous 
deductions, exclusions, and credits from the tax law, reducing 
tax rates in compensation. Of course, with no money to give 
away and major changes in the law, it follows immediately 
that some taxpayers will win in the process, but others will 
lose. Nevertheless, by transferring revenues from the corpo 
rate sector to finance a household sector tax cut, the President 
can promise most households tax relief when the dust finally 
settles.
This kind of tax reform is acceptable to just about everyone 
(except those who lose deductions, exclusions, or credits that 
are particularly close to their hearts and wallets). In fact, tax 
reform is remarkable in uniting the tax field's "old fogies" and 
the "young turks." Old line tax reformers, of course, would 
like nothing more than a broader individual income tax base 
with lower rates. And even the supply-siders, if they really 
mean what they say about the primary importance of reducing 
marginal tax rates, have to agree with the wisdom of such tax 
reform. For them, a tax cut in dollar terms is not a necessary 
condition for supply-side economics to work. (In fact, from a 
more conventional point of view, supply-side economics could 
be successful if the tax base were broadened to recoup the 
revenue loss, and so no money were given away. In that case, 
the lower tax rates could encourage more work and saving, 
without a cash windfall to encourage leisure and spending.) So 
individual income tax reform a la Reagan 1985 has become 
part of the conventional wisdom of economic policymaking, 
even if it is not every interest group's cup of tea.
Business tax reform proposals follow right along with the 
individual version. Many of the individual income tax prefer-
37
ences that cause the most unfairness and manipulative tax 
sheltering ACRS, the ITC, accelerated and exaggerated 
writeoffs for oil and gas drilling, accounting abuses also are 
used in the corporate sector. If they are repealed for house 
holds, then they must be repealed for corporations too. Just as 
marginal tax rates are reduced for households in compensa 
tion for the revenue gains from base broadening, so they are 
reduced for corporations. After all, the corporate income tax 
is really just a proxy tax on income that is temporarily held 
outside of the household sector; we tax corporations because, 
if we did not, households could set up corporations to hold 
and invest their money and therefore act as tax shelters. The 
reduction of corporate marginal tax rates keeps the top 
corporate rate roughly in line with the top individual rate, so 
that the proxy tax does not encourage the organization of 
businesses in either incorporated or unincorporated forms.
Thus, the conventional wisdom on individual income tax 
reform dictates the nature of tax reform on the corporate side; 
and because it is both conventional and wisdom, with agree 
ment from many ideological adversaries, everything must be 
hunky dory.
Mustn't it?
Lately there have been two distinct challenges to the 
corporate branch of tax reform as now preached and prac 
ticed. One challenge comes from within the traditional tax 
reform ranks and some other mainstream economists. This 
group argues that low-rate, low-subsidy corporate tax reform 
fails to make a proper distinction between old and new 
investments in plant and equipment. The argument goes like 
this: Corporations invested in depreciable capital in the past 
assuming that they would pay tax on any net income at 46 
percent (the highest corporate rate, at which most corporate 
income is taxed). Under tax reform, however, that tax rate
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would be cut to anywhere from 30 to 35 percent. That tax cut, 
the argument goes, is a pure windfall for investment that is 
already made, so that much of the revenue lost through the 
rate cut is wasted. The merit of the investment tax credit and 
accelerated depreciation, the story continues, is that they 
benefit only new investment. The high corporate tax rate that 
goes along with these subsidies (of necessity, to make up the 
revenues loss) then soaks up much of any abnormally high 
profits (or "rents") of old investments, without discouraging 
new investment. So this challenge is based on arguments of 
both economic and cost efficiency. (This argument underlies 
the Reagan administration's proposed "windfall recapture 
tax" on the benefits of past accelerated depreciation.) An 
extension of this argument is that a high corporate tax rate, 
falling as it most likely does on owners of capital, helps to 
make the overall tax system more progressive.
The other challenge comes not so much from economists as 
from the business sector. Some (but by no means all) business 
leaders argue that any diminution of incentives to invest, 
either through increases in the corporate tax burden (which 
the Reagan administration proposes to fund individual in 
come tax cuts) or through cutbacks of targeted investment 
subsidies, pushes in the wrong direction. The nation needs 
more investment, this argument goes, because a shortage of 
investment has been the culprit in our recent economic 
sluggishness. More investment would increase productivity, 
because investment is what brings the latest technology into 
the production process. From this point of view, tax reform's 
emphasis on the efficient allocation of investment, rather than 
on the raw amount of investment, is misplaced; we could end 
up with a better allocation of less capital, and be worse off 
when the dust settles.
Of course, this business argument is far from universally 
held; and keeping in mind business' tendency to look at the
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bottom line, this is not surprising. Remember that under a 
revenue-neutral business tax reform, some corporations 
would pay less tax, and some corporations would pay more. 
Because every business executive probably has a very keen 
sense of his firm's contribution to society, those executives 
whose firms would lose cash flow naturally have had negative 
things to say. Likewise, of course, leaders of firms that would 
win from tax reform (including primarily those firms most 
heavily taxed under the current law) have come forward 
aggressively to favor reform. This is another respect in which 
1985 differs most vividly from 1981; four years ago, businesses 
marched in lockstep for the huge tax cut represented by 
ACRS; today, because there would be losers as well as 
winners, the ranks are highly fractionated.
Consequently, economists and business leaders are divided 
on business tax reform, with the ultimate emphasis on growth. 
Some policy analysts and businessmen say that tax reform 
would make our nation leaner and tougher; others counter 
that business would be smaller and weaker. In the corporate 
sector, this division is easily explained by self-interest; but 
similar disagreements among economists prevent us from 
assuming that the only issue is whose oxen are gored. If we 
want to make the best possible judgment, we must go beyond 
the politics of the issue and analyze the economics.
Taking Stock
So what are the merits of these arguments? Will tax reform 
encourage or inhibit growth? To approach an answer, we 
must use economic theory, our recent experience, and (be 
cause we are contemplating new policy tools) some new 
thinking. We should certainly start by examining the link 
between tax policy and investment, but before we finish, we 
must also reconsider the often-assumed link between invest 
ment and growth.
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Theory. Unfortunately, as even the most avid theorists and 
econometricians would admit, our understanding of what 
causes investment is fuzzy at best. Two theories probably hold 
the most currency: the cost of capital theory and the acceler 
ator theory.
The cost of capital theory relies on neoclassical economics, 
putting a heavy emphasis on the supplies of factors of 
production, and less on the levels of aggregate demand needed 
to assure that those factors of production are fully employed. 
The cost of capital model focuses on how much it costs in 
interest, depreciation, and taxes, among other expenses to 
use a given quantity of capital for a given length of time. 
Because an equity investor in a unit of capital will want some 
positive return to justify his investment, there will most likely 
be some tax liability as part of the cost of capital. This tax 
liability increases the before-tax return needed to provide the 
investor with the minimum acceptable after-tax return (the 
least return that would induce the investor to make the 
investment). Thus, an increase in taxes on investment would 
make some previously acceptable investments unacceptable; it 
would raise the cost of capital for the marginal investment.
The accelerator theory, in contrast, looks more closely at 
the state of aggregate demand, and less closely at the supply of 
factors of production. It holds that investment is induced by 
increases in consumer demand which push on productive 
capacity, rather than by tax cuts for investment per se. From 
the point of view of the accelerator theory, a tax cut for 
investment income while businesses by and large have excess 
capacity would be wasted; it would be "pushing on a string," 
to invoke a common analogy. The revenue loss would go 
largely to businesses that would be investing anyway.
As was suggested not too long ago, neither of these two 
theories can claim an extreme of predictive accuracy. Empir-
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ical studies suggest that business behavior depends on many 
factors, surely including businessmen's varying perceptions of 
the conditions in their own varied markets. This diversity of 
view surely has much to do with the failure of any theoretical 
model to explain actual behavior.
Of the two models, though, it is the cost of capital model 
that is the more pertinent to the criticisms of tax reform 
related above. Economists would argue that incentives should 
be targeted to new investments, and businessmen would 
emphasize the level of business taxes, whether through incen 
tives or not. The kind of demand-push fiscal stimulus envi 
sioned in the accelerator model seems to be out of the question 
at the moment; our demand seems to have been pushed about 
as far as it would go in 1981.
The Record. It is here that recent history can lend a hand. 
Surely the 1981 tax law was the quintessential reduction in the 
tax component of the cost of capital; it cut business taxes 
significantly through a substantial acceleration of deprecia 
tion, targeted on new investment. In fact, its reduction in the 
tax component of the cost of capital was so great that in many 
instances, it made that tax component negative. That is, it 
gave such accelerated deductions for depreciation, coupled 
with the pre-existing investment tax credit, that the tax 
deductions and credits wiped out the tax liability of the typical 
investment in its early years, with more tax benefits left over. 
If the investor had income from other sources against which 
he could claim the deductions and credits, those tax savings 
exceeded (in present value terms) the tax on the investment in 
question in its later years, after the deductions and credits 
were used up. Taking into account the tax savings on other 
income and the time value of money, ACRS and the ITC were 
so generous as to make many typical investments into tax 
shelters. If that wouldn't stimulate investment, what would?
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But did it stimulate investment? Here opinions differ. Some 
business advocates argue that the recovery of investment from 
the 1981-82 recession has been remarkable, and they seem to 
have the numbers on their side. Business investments in 
nonresidential structures and in equipment have grown more 
rapidly after this recession than they have in the typical 
previous post-World War II recovery. Advocates of generous 
tax treatment of investment assign this growth to the 1981 tax 
cuts.
A critical look at the numbers, however, leads to a far 
different outcome. The most important issue is just where this 
apparent boom in investment has gone. Barry Bosworth has 
shown that the increase in investment in equipment is highly 
concentrated in two types of assets: computers and business 
automobiles. It happens that the one area where ACRS was 
not generous was in its treatment of computers, which in fact 
fell between the cracks and were made subject to longer, not 
shorter, depreciable lives. The stimulus to investment in 
computers seems to have come from another direction: their 
falling prices. This episode just serves as a reminder that tax 
policy is by no means all of economics, and should not be the 
first resort for action on any problem that happens along. The 
boom in investment in business automobiles has an equally 
ideosyncratic explanation; consumers have become more in 
terested in automobile leasing as an alternative to purchase, 
and a leased automobile, even if used purely for personal 
purposes, is considered an investment by the leasing firm  
hence the jump in the investment figures.
When he omits computers and business automobiles from 
the investment statistics, Bosworth finds that the investment 
recovery from the 1981-82 recession looks much more typical 
from an historical perspective. In fact, when he measures the
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investment recovery relative to the previous business cycle 
peak, rather than the low point of the recession (which in 
1981-82 was extraordinarily low), Bosworth finds that the 
investment recovery has been below average (Barry P. Bos- 
worth, "Taxes and the Investment Recovery," Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1:1985, pp. 1-38).
A further qualification of the strength of the investment 
recovery comes from an examination of investment in types of 
structures. Investment in industrial structures factories has 
been virtually flat since 1980. The growth of investment in 
nonresidential structures has been confined to commercial 
structures such as shopping centers and office buildings. 
Most analysts, certainly including many business advocates, 
would admit that investment in commercial structures was not 
a goal of the 1981 tax law, and has little potential impact on 
U.S. growth and competitiveness.
It is my conclusion from the data as described above that 
the extreme attempt at investment stimulus through tax policy 
undertaken in 1981 has failed, thus far, to produce demon 
strable results. This is especially true in light of the reinforcing 
of the "cost of capital" tax cut strategy with an "accelerator" 
tax cut promising a rush of consumer demand and encourag 
ing firms to build up their productive capacity.
There is certainly an argument that insufficient time has 
passed to pronounce judgment on the 1981 tax law, and that 
circumstances since 1981 have been extraordinary and have 
not allowed a fair test. One point worth considering, however 
is that the 1981 tax cuts may well have helped to create those 
extraordinary circumstances. Massive tax cuts, even on the 
order of ACRS taken alone, will increase the federal govern 
ment deficit and drive up interest rates. This is especially true 
because tax inducements to investment invariably are enjoyed 
by those who would have invested without the incentives, as
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well as the few who are affected at the margin. If the monetary 
authorities should fear an inflationary burst of excess demand 
and restrain the growth of the money supply, that will increase 
interest rates further. Because interest expense is an element of 
the cost of capital again, investment is determined by more 
than taxes alone an extreme strategy of investment subsidy 
through tax cuts can boomerang.
While we do not now have ironclad proof, the track record 
of tax subsidies for investment appears less than promising. In 
my judgment, we might well regard advocates of further 
investment subsidies in the tax code as 19th century physicians 
leaving a comatose patient to get more leeches.
The Issues
Why have tax incentives for investment had so little effect? 
In my opinion, despite its logical underpinnings, the cost-of- 
capital theory has some significant weaknesses as a guide to 
policy, especially when taken to extremes. I would like to 
discuss four areas in which I believe this is true.
New, Risky, and Recent-Loss Firms. To encourage invest 
ment under the cost-of-capital approach, taxes must be cut on 
the marginal investment. Significant tax cuts on investments 
earning only a minimum acceptable rate of return can take on 
strange forms, however. To stimulate investment in this way, 
ERTA resorted to such enormous accelerations of deprecia 
tion allowances that the tax on many marginal investments 
became negative. As was explained earlier, investors receive 
more deductions and credits than they need to wipe out all tax 
on the income generated by an investment early in its life. The 
excess deductions and credits can be used to offset tax on the 
investor's other income.
A problem arises if the investor does not have any other 
taxable income. In that case, the excess deductions just sit on
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the firm's accountant's shelf, depreciating with the passage of 
inflation. A firm in this situation has to raise more money in 
the credit markets to undertake an additional investment, 
because it does not have any reserves against taxes to draw 
down in anticipation of the value of the resulting tax prefer 
ences. Such a firm may postpone investments until a later 
date, when it expects to become profitable; or it may become 
prey for a takeover by some other firm that does have taxable 
income. (As was noted earlier, the 1981 tax law included 
safe-harbor leasing as a safety valve for just such situations, 
but the public found the results of tax leasing too offensive.)
These problems befall particular kinds of firms: new firms, 
which typically make large start-up investments and do not 
earn profits for several years; firms that have recently been 
unprofitable and are attempting to turn their situations 
around; and technologically advanced (colloquially, "high 
tech") firms, which make large investments with long gesta 
tion periods and uncertain chances of success. For these firms 
and for any others that cannot use their investment subsidies 
immediately, the tax benefits are significantly less valuable; 
consequently, some portion of the business population is left 
out of the investment subsidy strategy and disadvantaged by 
it. This could well make our investment performance under a 
cost of capital strategy less favorable than we might expect. 
Furthermore, it is far from clear that it is in our economic 
interest to favor large, established firms in traditional lines of 
business.
Tax Shelters. As was noted earlier, even a traditional 
investment can receive a negative effective tax rate under 
ACRS. It should not be surprising, then, that tax shelter 
brokers can achieve new heights of manipulation under the 
current law. In 1981, for the first time in a quarter century of 
compiled statistics, the entire partnership sector of the econ-
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omy (partnerships are the preferred vehicles for tax shelters) 
showed an aggregate net loss, so great was the boom in tax 
sheltering. In 1982, this dubious distinction was repeated. The 
availability of ACRS depreciation deductions effective Janu 
ary 1, 1981, was an important cause of this development. Tax 
shelters cost the federal government revenue, and they waste 
capital as well; without the benefits of tax sheltering, there is 
no doubt that less of the U.S. capital stock would be allocated 
into investments in the oil and gas industry, and in residential 
and commercial real estate.
The use of real estate as a tax shelter causes another serious 
problem of resource misallocation. Commercial and residen 
tial real estate makes an effective tax shelter because it is easily 
resaleable (apartment and office buildings make safe and 
liquid investments because they almost always have many 
alternative users), and so it can be highly leveraged. That way, 
small amounts of cash can generate large amounts of depre 
ciation deductions. In contrast, factories have fewer alterna 
tive users, and so they are riskier investments, and less 
amenable to debt finance. If commercial and industrial struc 
tures received depreciation treatment equally generous to that 
of equipment, this tax sheltering would get completely out of 
hand. To prevent this, depreciation for shelters is made less 
generous than that for equipment (measured by the actual 
reduction in value, i.e., economic depreciation, over time). But 
this less generous depreciation treatment of structures carries 
over to disadvantage investments in factories, as opposed to 
shopping centers and office buildings. The tax bias away from 
industrial structures can only hinder growth over the long run 
by encouraging investments in modern equipment to be 
placed in outmoded structures. It is an inevitable outgrowth of 
an unbalanced policy with extreme incentives for investments 
in equipment.
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Double Taxation of Corporate Income. Another aspect of 
the investment incentive strategy is its effect on the double 
taxation of corporate source income. As was noted earlier, the 
rich investment incentives in the current law cost revenue, and 
so for any given revenue target, statutory tax rates must be 
higher. (Because the same generous depreciation must be 
made available to individual as to corporate investors, this 
strategy increases individual tax rates as well as corporate tax 
rates.) These higher tax rates increase the double tax on corpo 
rate source income at the margin, that is, on an additional dollar 
of fully taxable corporate income that is then distributed.
Sensitivity to Inflation. Another source of distortions be 
cause of the high tax rates required to finance large investment 
incentives is the interaction of the income tax and inflation. 
With higher tax rates, the mismeasurement of income and of 
interest expense due to inflation is more serious. (Further, 
ACRS itself is highly sensitive to inflation; at the low inflation 
rates that we currently enjoy, ACRS is an even greater net 
subsidy to investment than was anticipated at its enactment 
during the high inflation of 1981.)
Summary. A frequently heard argument for investment 
subsidies is that they encourage risk taking and innovation. As 
the foregoing analysis suggests, however, this is true in only a 
limited sense. Rich tax subsidies like ACRS encourage a risk 
taking and innovation, but mostly by large, established firms; 
newcomers and revitalized firms get less of a tax advantage. 
Further, if the incentive to innovate is a function of the 
after-tax income that the innovation will yield, and if the tax 
rate is close to 50 percent for either an individual or a 
corporation, that incentive has to be blunted. A firm or an 
individual with a new idea has to think twice about the 
relationship of after-tax reward to risk. What our current tax 
code seems to foster more than anything, in fact, is ultra-safe 
investments like real estate.
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It was with this tenor of the current tax code in mind that 
I raised my opening question about a low-risk, low-return 
lottery compared to a high-risk, high-return one. The current 
tax law, for all its stated intentions about innovation, seems 
more directed toward stand-pat investments. Business lobby 
ists may well argue that the world will end if our rich 
investment incentives are cut back or repealed. We should not 
be surprised by this; after all, that is what business lobbyists 
are (well) paid to do. Business executives, if they do what they 
are (well) paid to do, will seek out investments where there is 
profit to be made; and that task will not be changed by the 
repeal of tax subsidies for investment.
We can only wonder how our economy would perform if 
the tax code were purged of opportunities for low-risk, 
tax-shelter arbitrage, and were left with only a substantial 
reward for truly productive activity. There are some thoughts, 
however, that might give some idea of the potential benefits of 
tax reform.
Tax Reform Tomorrow
There is reason to believe that many of the allegations of tax 
reform harming investment are either unimportant or inaccu 
rate. There are other reasons why tax reform could in fact 
create a better climate for investment than many observers 
would anticipate. And there is further reason to expect that in 
tax reform as currently contemplated, getting there will be half 
the fun.
Investment and Growth. One possible criticism of tax reform 
from the cost-of-capital view of the world would be the likely 
increase in the tax burden on the marginal investment. With 
ACRS extending negative tax rates to many investments, 
there is no question that the current law reduces the required 
rate of return for investment. Tax reform, by repealing these
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net subsidies, would raise the required rate of return. Is this a 
serious disadvantage of tax reform? What would its effect be?
From a real world perspective, it is difficult to evaluate just 
how important it is to drive down the required rate of return 
to the extent that ACRS does. There is no telling just how 
often a firm contemplates an investment that it truly believes 
to be marginal. Some investments wind up earning barely a 
required rate of return; indeed, some wind up earning only 
losses. But it is unlikely that those investments were under 
taken in anticipation of performing unsatisfactorily, or even 
marginally.
Further, and more important, the connection between 
investment and growth is almost certainly exaggerated by 
many casual commentators; in particular, the value of stretch 
ing investment a margin further in a given year is easily 
overstated. If markets work (and if they do not, I am unsure 
why you invited an economist to speak to you this evening), 
then the best investments, the ones that make the greatest 
contributions to productivity and growth, are the ones that 
will pass any reasonable market test. The investments that 
could then be teased out of the economy at the margin are the 
ones whose value is, well, marginal. As I argued earlier, a 
good deal of the additional investment stimulated by ACRS 
was apparently in tax shelters. This suggests that we must 
examine critically those casual notions about investment being 
the engine of all progress and growth, and the risks that tax 
reform, being less generous at the margin, will somehow 
reduce our well being.
Benefits of Tax Reform. Criticisms of tax reform on the 
basis of its impact on the tax component of a cost of capital 
formula ignore its other potentially beneficial effects.
As was noted above, the likely outcome of a low-rate 
income tax with neutral, nonsubsidized depreciation is a
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reduction of tax sheltering. This welcome development would 
redirect billions of dollars from socially unproductive invest 
ments in real estate and other tax-favored areas into more 
traditional investment fields. The additional capital would 
offset the effect of the elimination of investment subsidies.
Likewise, a reduction in marginal tax rates for individuals 
has the potential to encourage saving. In all likelihood, the 
increase in saving would be modest, but it would be welcome; 
and it would make more funds available for traditional 
investments. Perhaps even more significant, reduced tax rates 
and cutbacks of deductibility of interest on consumer loans 
(including increases in the zero bracket amount, which reduce 
the number of people who itemize) will decrease borrowing, 
which is negative saving.
The importance of these developments should not be 
ignored. Many business advocates seem to take a tunnel view 
of tax reform and investment, seeing only the repeal of the 
investment credit or of ACRS. What such observers fail to see 
is favorable movements of another element of the cost of 
capital: interest expense. If capital moves from tax shelters 
into traditional investments, and household saving and bor 
rowing shift modestly but favorably, tax changes in the cost of 
capital could be offset by reduced borrowing costs, leaving the 
business sector better off.
Another beneficial effect of tax reform and lower marginal 
tax rates will be a greater incentive to work. Again, changes 
will likely be modest, but favorable. When all of these changes 
occur simultaneously, and all are movements in the right 
direction, there is at least the potential for a favorable 
synergism where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
The Joy of Transition. In most changes of tax laws, the 
transition phase is a source of pain and complexity. In many
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respects, a major tax reform may be no different. But in terms 
of the incentive to invest, the transition may be a major plus.
President Reagan has proposed a tax cut for individuals to 
be financed by a tax increase on corporations. Many of the 
revenue-raising steps under the corporate tax, by their nature, 
grow into their full effect over several years. This is generally 
true of changes in depreciation, which affect only investments 
made after the passage of the law, and so embrace the entire 
capital stock only as the pre-existing capital stock wears out 
over a period of years. (This revenue pattern would not hold 
under the administration's current depreciation proposal 
which, through newfound generosity, in fact loses revenue in 
the long run. This is a source of concern regarding the 
administration's plan.)
Because the revenue gain tends to be less in the early years, 
revenue neutrality requires that certain steps be taken to raise 
revenue in the first years after enactment. One such proposal 
was the administration's windfall recapture tax, which would 
add into taxable income a fraction of accelerated depreciation 
allowances claimed since 1980, and would raise revenue for 
only four years. As was explained above, this provision is 
intended to recover some of the windfall gain to corporations 
who invested in anticipation of paying tax at a 46 percent rate, 
only to be greeted by a tax reform that would impose tax at 
only 33 percent. Whatever its merits, the windfall recapture 
tax has met with extreme hostility, largely on grounds of being 
a retroactive burden. Its chances of enactment are considered 
to be slim.
The obvious alternative to the recapture tax as a purely 
temporary revenue raiser is a phasing in of the corporate tax 
rate reduction. While politically only a second choice to the 
current administration, the corporate rate cut phase-in is an 
economic gold mine. Consider these attributes:
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First, the rate cut phase-in acts as a short-run investment 
incentive. A firm that invests early on can claim its deprecia 
tion deductions against a higher tax rate, making them more 
valuable.
And second, the phase-in concentrates the benefits of the 
ultimate rate reduction on new rather than old capital. In the 
first years of the phase-in, pre-existing capital is subject to a 
relatively high rate of tax, reducing the windfall for which 
some economists criticize tax reform. As the pre-existing 
capital wears out, however, the statutory tax rates are re 
duced, giving the relief to a greater extent to capital purchased 
after the tax reform takes effect. In the long run, the rate 
reduction rains down more than it otherwise would on new 
capital, making tax reform more cost effective in terms of 
stimulating new investment.
Thus, a temporary provision needed to make tax reform 
revenue-neutral over the short run could defuse much of the 
criticism of the entire grand undertaking on grounds of its 
effect on investment.
Summary. Several aspects of tax reform have the potential 
to improve significantly the economic climate in general, and 
that for investment in particular. Observers who view tax 
reform from one particular perspective have a tendency to 
miss this big picture. We should keep the broad view in mind 
when we make our decisions on tax reform.
Conclusion
Over the past few years, in our frequent episodes of tax 
"reform," we have tended to look for tax remedies to too 
many of our problems economic and otherwise. By now, it is 
almost an article of faith to some people that tax policy is the 
most important determinant of business investment. Perhaps
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this is only predictable, because a business lobbyist who can 
wheedle a tax preference from the Congress can deliver to his 
clients risk-free cash flow, while an engineer or designer can 
only give his firm a roll of the dice in the free and competitive 
market.
As difficult as it may be, though, we must question those 
new preconceptions of taxation as the key to our future. After 
all, if tax incentives are so important, how did our nation grow 
so fast before it even had an income tax? Was Christopher 
Columbus really sailing for Washington to make the case for 
an exploration tax credit? Did anyone really argue whether 
the wagon trains were depreciable or not?
As one who has specialized in the economics of taxation, I 
can only report my opinion: that tax policy is crucial to our 
economy now only because it has been stretched beyond all 
reasonable bounds, to interfere in sector after sector. If it were 
drawn back, the economy would thrive in the short run, after 
some transition pains, only because it would be freed from the 
shackles that the current tax law imposes. In the long run, our 
economic prospects would depend on our ingenuity and 
energy. No one can guarantee that those qualities will be 
enough in an ever more competitive world economy, but for 
myself, I would rather rely on our energy and ingenuity than 
on some purported incentive in an incomprehensible tax law.
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Fiscal policy has been a hot topic in recent years and 
remains so today. No wonder. Since 1981 the federal govern 
ment has made substantial cuts in personal income taxes, 
provided the largest investment incentives in the country's 
history, significantly altered the projected course of Social 
Security benefits, and run enormous official budget deficits. 
However, all this fiscal action has apparently just whetted the 
appetites of fiscal enthusiasts who are now proposing what 
has been billed as fundamental tax reform.
My focus in this talk is not to review recent fiscal history or 
presage current tax reform bills, but to discuss an issue that 
has bothered me repeatedly over the past few years. Put 
simply, my question is the following: in thinking about fiscal 
policy and particularly about government debt, have we been 
taken in by the accountants and have we, as a result, been 
missing the economic forest for the trees? I hope to convince 
you that the answer, if not yes, is at least maybe. My sniping 
at economic accounting is not to disparage the accounting 
profession; indeed my real gripe is not with accountants, but 
rather with economists who are so often misled by the labeling 
of economic variables and then compound the error by 
misleading others.
Before I turn to substantive points, let me say that I am not 
arguing for different or better accounting. In my view, ac-
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counting is properly chosen after, not before, one chooses 
one's economic model. The accounting constructs that are 
appropriate for one model may be totally inappropriate for 
another. For example, while one can conceive of a model in 
which the government's current definition of the deficit is 
meaningful, one can also write down other models in which 
the current definition has little or no relation to the govern 
ment's fundamental debt policy. Unfortunately, economists, 
when speaking publicly, typically fail to explicate their models 
and take the easy route of discussing the official numbers that 
are available and generally familiar, despite the fact that these 
numbers may be highly misleading indicators of the numbers 
actually suggested by their theories.
In this and other respects, we are tyrannized by our 
accounting. Somehow or other, official numbers invite con 
cern and comment, and, when research funding is available, 
official numbers also invite investigation. A prime example is 
the industry of international finance economists who investi 
gate changes in countries' balances of payment. Fortunately, 
we do not keep balance of payment accounts for each state in 
the U.S. or we would have an industry of economists studying 
the balance of payments crisis between Michigan and Tennes 
see and related nonsense.
Let me illustrate my concern about fiscal illusion by asking 
you to consider the Social Security taxes you pay to the 
government. Notice that the word "taxes" has been ascribed 
to the Social Security payments you and your employer send 
to the government. But why is the word "taxes" used? It's 
used because some accountant or economist arbitrarily chose 
that word back in 1936 or thereabouts. Suppose we label these 
payments to the government differently. Let's label them 
"loans" from you to the government. You may object to this 
nomenclature, but bear with it for the moment.
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Loans are typically repaid, so let's also label Social Security 
benefit payments "return of principal plus interest." Note that 
from your point of view the new terminology is not completely 
foreign. With the new language, you can now think of 
yourselves as lending money to the government (in the form of 
Social Security contributions) during your working years and 
receiving principal plus interest (in the form of Social Security 
benefit payments) during your retirement. Surely this se 
quence of payments and receipts is very similar to those 
associated with purchasing a government Treasury bond. 
When you purchase a Treasury bond or other security, you 
make payments to the government now in exchange for future 
receipts from the government. Hence, from your point of 
view, your payment of what is called Social Security "taxes" 
is, in most respects, equivalent to your purchase of a govern 
ment liability. While the mean return and risk properties of 
your invisible Social Security bonds differ from those of 
official government bonds, such differences in risk properties 
provide no basis for labeling one set of payments to the 
government "taxes" and the other set of payments "loans."
Let's now make the invisible Social Security bonds visible 
by supposing that the federal government, starting at the 
inception of the Social Security system, had also adopted the 
language of lending and borrowing to describe its flows of 
payments from and to the public sector and, indeed, had 
issued explicit Social Security bonds to the public in exchange 
for Social Security contributions. We are supposing then that 
Social Security system sends a piece of paper marked Social 
Security bond to each worker in exchange for his or her Social 
Security contribution.
Consider now the impact on the government's measure of 
official debt of switching from the "tax" and "transfer" 
language to the language of "lending" and "repayment." As 
you can read in the Appendix to chapter 4 of the 1982
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Economic Report of the President, this change in language, 
while involving no change in fundamentals, would have 
radically altered current and past reports of the federal debt 
and federal deficits. The government would have reported 
official deficits in the 1960s over $300 billion dollars for several 
years and deficits over $100 billion dollars for most years 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Since the price level and size of 
the economy was much smaller then than now, as a fraction of 
GNP these alternative deficit figures would swamp those of 
recent years. With this alternative labeling of Social Security 
receipts and payments 1985 official government debt would 
exceed its current $1.5 trillion value by a factor of roughly 5.
Presumably, such a redefinition of official government 
liabilities would raise the question of classifying other implicit 
commitments to future expenditures as government debt. If 
one is willing to label implicit promises to pay future retire 
ment benefits official liabilities, why not include implicit 
expenditure commitments to maintain the national parks, to 
defend the country, or to provide minimum sustenance to the 
poor?
A heated debate about the appropriate definition of gov 
ernment debt would likely lead some shrewd economist to 
suggest eliminating official government debt and deficits en 
tirely by just using some more of what is essentially innovative 
accounting. This economist would suggest that rather than 
raise additional funds by issuing government securities, the 
government should simply levy a head "tax" per adult 
promising to provide each adult in the following or some 
subsequent year a refundable tax credit equal to the "tax" plus 
interest on the "tax." If the adult died before repayment, the 
"tax" credit would be paid to his or her estate. Furthermore, 
those who are liquidity-constrained would be permitted to 
borrow against their future "tax" credits.
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The equality, in present value, between each household's 
head tax and its head tax credit leaves household budgets and, 
therefore, private behavior unaltered. However, since future 
tax credits, like future Social Security benefit payments, are 
not reported in the current federal budget, this policy permits 
the government to report a smaller deficit. If the head tax is 
sufficiently large, the government could potentially eliminate 
not only this year's official deficit, but indeed the entire stock 
of outstanding government debt. If it made the head "tax" 
sufficiently large, the government could report a very substan 
tial surplus. Those of you who are following closely the details 
of this head "tax" "tax" credit policy will see that it 
effectively amounts to relabeling as "taxes" the receipts the 
government obtains from selling bonds, and relabeling as 
"tax" credits the payments made by the government of 
interest plus principal on its sale of bonds.
To summarize, I've pointed out that with a little change in 
labeling of Social Security receipts and payments, the govern 
ment's reported debt would be roughly five times its current 
value; alternatively, with a little relabeling of the money it 
receives and pays out in its bond transactions, the government 
could wipe out any reported debt and report instead enor 
mous surpluses. But my point is not that we can color red 
what is really black or color black what is really red. My point 
is that in most economic models, particularly the standard 
neoclassical model, there is really no fundamental distinction 
between what is currently painted red and what is currently 
painted black, i.e., in most models there are no real reds and 
blacks when it comes to labeling government receipts and 
payments.
If I have you scratching your heads, I'm happy. I'm 
delighted if you believe, as do I, that money which the 
government calls taxes could just as well be called borrowing
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and vice versa. But if I've gotten you to agree with me that our 
official debt numbers are inherently arbitrary, then you should 
also agree that these numbers provide little guide to the 
fundamental stance of fiscal policy. If we can't rely on these 
numbers, how do we go about assessing the extent of redis 
tribution from younger to older generations, which is what 
most economists and perhaps most noneconomists associate 
with the concern about government debt?
The answer is that we need to examine directly the lifetime 
budget constraints of different generations and ask whether 
government policies have expanded the lifetime consumption 
opportunities of older generations at the price of reduced 
lifetime consumption opportunities of younger and future 
generations. The answer to this question is invariant to how 
we label particular receipts and payments between the private 
economy and the government. Accounting doesn't matter 
when looking at a generation's budget constraint because the 
bottom line is how much can the generation afford to 
consume; this depends on the generations' lifetime receipts 
from the government net of payments to the government, not 
on how particular receipts and payments are labeled.
Once one becomes attuned to thinking about economic 
debt policy in terms of intergenerational redistribution, it 
becomes clear that a variety of government policies, many of 
which have no direct effect on reported government deficits, 
transfer resources from later to earlier generations. Before 
describing these mechanisms, it's worth mentioning why one 
should care about intergenerational redistribution towards 
older generations. The answer is that, as a result of such a 
transfer, older generations are likely to increase their con 
sumption by more than younger generations lower their 
consumption. The reason is that older generations have fewer 
years left to live and consequently have fewer years over which
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to consume the additional resources. Younger generations, on 
the other hand, spread their reduction in lifetime resources 
over more years; hence, their response to the transfer is to 
lower their consumption this year somewhat, knowing they 
will also lower their consumption for many years in the future. 
In the jargon of economists, older generations are likely to 
have larger marginal propensities to consume than younger 
generations. If this is true, then intergenerational redistribu 
tion will eventuate in an increase in total national consump 
tion and, according to neoclassical models, a decline in total 
national saving. The decline in saving may also spell a decline 
in investment and higher real interest rates as capital becomes 
a relatively scarce factor of production.
Economists and others in the U.S. are properly concerned 
abut this crowding-out process. Since 1980 we have been 
saving only 4.7 percent of our net national product. In 
contrast, we saved 7.8 percent of NNP in the 1970s, 8.7 
percent in the 1960s, and 8.8 percent in the 1950s. While the 
current saving rate of 5.2 percent is above that of the early 
1980s, it is still 41 percent lower than the saving rate of the 
1950s.
In addition to redistributing to older generations by cutting 
"taxes" now and raising "taxes" in the future, i.e., reducing 
payments from the private sector to the government now and 
increasing such payments in the future, the government 
employs several other mechanisms of intergenerational redis 
tribution, some of which are quite subtle. One somewhat 
subtle mechanism is running an unfunded, "pay as you go" 
Social Security system.
In this Ponzi scheme, younger working generations pay 
money to Social Security which hands the money over to 
older, retired generations in the form of retirement benefits. In 
this scheme, every generation pays for the retirement benefits
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of the previous generation with one exception; at the initiation 
of the program the first generation receives benefits without 
having to finance the retirement of its immediate predecessors. 
This generation receives a windfall at the expense of younger 
and future generations whose lifetime budgets would be 
greater were they not enrolled in Social Security.
While many of the big winners from Social Security are 
already deceased, there is still significant intergenerational 
redistribution from Social Security. Middle income house 
holds who were born in 1930 are predicted roughly to break 
even from the system. In contrast, middle income households 
in the cohort born in 1990 are projected over their lifetimes to 
lose, on net, roughly $60,000 in present value as a consequence 
of participating in Social Security.
Another subtle intergenerational transfer mechanism is 
changes in the tax base that shift the burden of "taxation" 
(payments to the government) from older to younger genera 
tions. An example here is switching from an income tax that 
taxes the capital income of the elderly as well as the labor 
earnings of the young and middle-aged to a wage tax that hits 
only the young and middle-aged. A variant of this type of 
fundamental debt policy is increases in the progressivity of the 
income tax. Switching from a less to a more progressive 
income tax shifts more of the tax burden onto middle-aged 
and younger workers whose annual incomes are larger than 
those of retired elderly for whom income consists simply of 
the return on savings.
Perhaps the most subtle mechanism of intergenerational 
redistribution is government policies that lower the market 
value of financial assets. Since older generations are the 
primary owners of assets, a reduction in asset values reduces 
the consumption opportunities of the elderly; at the same 
time, it expands the consumption opportunities of younger
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generations who, through time, can purchase these assets from 
older generations at a lower price.
An example of such a policy is reducing investment incen 
tives, which, by the way, is part of the President's tax reform 
proposal. Since investment incentives in the U.S. are effec 
tively restricted to new investment, old capital, capital that has 
been fully or partially written off, sells at a discount reflecting 
the preferential tax treatment available to new capital. A 
reduction in investment incentives means a smaller discount 
on old capital, i.e., a capital gain to owners of old capital. This 
capital gain accrues to older generations, and young and 
middle-aged generations are worse off because they must pay 
a higher price to acquire claims to the economy's capital 
stock.
Having pointed out these various mechanisms for running 
true economic debt policies and having argued strongly that 
one cannot gauge these policies by looking at official debt 
numbers, it's time to look at the reality of recent economic 
debt policy. The Reagan personal income tax cuts have 
certainly enhanced the lifetime budgets of older generations at 
the expense of younger generations, but, up to the present, the 
magnitude of this intergenerational redistribution appears 
small when set against the massive intergenerational redistri 
bution in the 1960s and 1970s associated with Social Security.
A second feature of Reagan's fiscal policy is the sizable 
investment incentives passed in 1981. As argued above, this 
policy generates capital losses to owners of existing (old) 
capital and constitutes an economic surplus policy. My sense 
of the magnitude of this redistribution when set against the 
redistribution from the tax cuts is that it corresponds, very 
roughly, to having postponed the tax cuts by one year.
The third significant fiscal policy altering the intergenera 
tional resource distribution is the 1983 Social Security reform.
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From the perspective of at least 1977, Social Security's 
long-run finances seemed fairly secure. But the ensuing reces 
sions and other economic and demographic events changed 
the long- as well as short-run picture. The 1983 reforms made 
very substantial cuts in the future benefits of all current young 
generations. The new Social Security law gradually raises the 
retirement age to 67 and envisions, through the process of 
bracket creep, the eventual income taxation of Social Security 
benefits of all retirees, not simply high income retirees as is 
now the case.
For current young generations, these legislated long-term 
cuts in Social Security benefits are very sizable when com 
pared, for example, with the tax savings they have enjoyed to 
date from the Reagan tax cut. Hence this policy also repre 
sents a significant economic surplus policy since it is reducing 
the welfare of current young generations while improving the 
projected welfare of future generations.
My assessment is that the Reagan fiscal policy has, to date, 
generated, on net, a small economic surplus, although this 
assessment could change signs if tax rates are not raised in the 
near future. However, whether one views the policy in toto as 
transferring to older or to younger generations, it is clear that 
the national hysteria concerning deficits has been predicated 
on a set of numbers that have little or no relationship to the 
issue of fundamental concern. Asserting that the deficit num 
bers have no clothes is not the same as asserting that all is fine 
in our economic house. On the contrary, it appears clear that 
the country is experiencing a secular decline in saving which 
may well be the result of the unreported enormous economic 
deficits associated with Social Security in the last three 
decades.
In closing, let me point out that a very real problem with the 
current fixation on the official budget deficit is that once that
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number is fixed, through either a real or an accounting policy, 
the public and the government will lose interest in the question 
of debt, and, indeed, may return to the kinds of hidden debt 
policies of the last 30 years. It is high time to remove the 
blinders. Fiscal illusion is a very real problem; it not only 
blinds us to current fiscal reality, it also leaves us very little 
guide to improving our economic future.
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Introduction*
As you know, the nation is now embroiled in a debate 
concerning the merits of major structural reform of the federal 
income tax system involving both the broadening of the tax 
base by elimination of exclusions, exemptions, and deduc 
tions, and the reduction of both the number and progressivity 
of rate brackets. A central element of nearly all such tax 
reform plans is curtailment or elimination of the itemized 
deduction for state and local taxes now available to individual 
taxpayers. Therefore, I will discuss first how federal tax 
reform might directly affect state and local governments, and 
second, how those subnational governments might respond to 
the federal tax changes. The potential pattern of winners and 
losers among the states will be discussed, and how state and 
local governments might be able to offset some of the effects 
of curtailment of federal deductibility and other reform 
changes by altering their own fiscal structure and behavior will 
be considered.
Before considering the tax reform proposals specifically, it 
may be useful to note the opinion of several experts regarding 
tax reform. In introducing his tax reform proposal to the 
nation in May of 1985, President Reagan concluded that "The 
tax system has come to be unAmerican." In contrast, Senator 
Russell Long, at one time chairman of the Senate Finance
"These comments were first offered as a lecture in January 1986. A postscript has been added 
to incorporate details of the tax bill adopted by Congress in September 1986.
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Committee (the committee which considers tax policy in the 
U.S. Senate) noted in 1967 that
Many businessmen contribute to legislators who 
have fought against taxes that would have been 
burdensome to their businesses, whether the tax 
increase was proposed as a so-called reform, a 
loophole closer, or just an effort to balance the 
federal budget.
(Congregational Record, April 4, 1967.)
Finally, at an unknown date and regarding an unknown topic, 
Yogi Berra is reported to have said: "It's deja vu all over 
again."
Obviously, these views are very different. The President, on 
the one hand, argues that the tax system, with its myriad 
exclusions, deductions, and credits, is unAmerican, and per 
haps that it is unpatriotic to support the current tax structure 
and oppose major reform. In response, the President offered 
what he called "America's tax plan." But Senator Long, with 
long tax experience in the Congress, had a very different 
notion. He argued that businessmen will contribute to politi 
cal officials in an attempt to protect their own economic 
interest. Rather than being unAmerican, Senator Long sug 
gests that this behavior is typical of and fully expected in 
American politics. I think we can expand his notion of 
businessmen to almost everyone. Certainly we have recently 
observed that state and local government officials and their 
representatives can be equally as active, and perhaps equally 
as effective, as businessmen in trying to influence the Congress 
when it comes to tax reform. And, as Mr. Berra noted, it is 
deja vu all over again! The tax code which the President 
characterized as unAmerican developed over many years, not 
instantly. In addition, most of the ideas included in the current 
tax reform proposals have been proposed and debated in the
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past, at least over the last 25 years. And what Senator Long 
observed in 1967 is equally true today.
What, then, is different about the current tax reform 
debate? Perhaps it is that in the past, reform proposals have 
largely come from experts economists, lawyers, and oth 
ers outside of government, while recently those same pro 
posals have been offered first by several Senators and Repre 
sentatives, then by the U.S. Treasury, and, most recently, by 
the President.
Review of Recent Proposals
Although a number of different tax reform plans were 
introduced in Congress in the past three years, let us concen 
trate here on the developments beginning with the release, in 
November 1984, of a proposal developed by the U.S. Depart 
ment of the Treasury at the President's request. That propos 
al, which came to be called Treasury I, would have increased 
the personal exemption and standard deduction, generally 
eliminated the itemized deductions (except in a very few 
cases), and indexed the tax structure for inflation, not only 
including indexation of tax rates, the personal exemption and 
the standard deduction, but also indexation in calculation of 
depreciation as well as interest and other capital income. 
Fringe benefits, such as employer-provided health insurance, 
would have been added to the tax base in a substantial way. 
Tax rates would have been confined to brackets of 15 percent, 
25 percent, and 35 percent. Business deductions would have 
been reduced or eliminated, the investment tax credit repealed, 
and the corporate tax rate set at 33 percent. The tax system 
would certainly have been simpler in what truly would have 
been significant reform.
In May of 1985, the President moved away from Treasury I, 
introducing his own tax reform plan, entitled "The President's
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Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and 
Simplicity," which came to be called Treasury II and referred 
to here as the President's Plan. This second plan encompassed 
major tax reform, but was substantially different from the 
original proposal in several important areas. Some itemized 
deductions, for example for charitable contributions, found 
their way back into the tax structure. The broad taxation of 
fringe benefits which had been proposed in Treasury I was 
effectively eliminated in Treasury II. The remaining proposed 
taxation of health insurance, for example, was effectively 
insignificant. A minimum tax was created to force individuals 
or firms which would not have liabilities under the general 
rules to pay some amount of tax. The second plan followed 
the first in raising personal exemptions and the standard 
deduction and using three rate classes (15 percent, 25 percent, 
35 percent).
With the President's proposal in hand, the Congress went to 
work. The House considered the issue throughout the summer 
and into the fall. Negotiations were alternately going forward 
at full speed and the next day breaking down. Finally, the 
House Ways and Means Committee reported out a bill, under 
the direction of chairman Rostenkowski, and in December the 
House passed a tax reform bill. This plan was substantially 
different from the proposal which the President had offered in 
May, and even more substantially different than the original 
Treasury proposal of the previous November.
First of all, the itemized deduction for state and local taxes 
was still allowed under the House bill; it would not have been 
under either of the two Reagan/Treasury proposals. A major 
issue of confrontation, therefore, was how to treat state and 
local taxes. There also was substantial difference in the 
treatment of fringe benefits. While the Reagan proposal 
would tax fringes less than the original Treasury proposal, the
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House proposal does so even less, so much so that, for all 
practical purposes, fringe benefits are not taxed in the House 
bill at all. The House proposal added a fourth rate bracket at 
38 percent, which would apply to joint returns with adjusted 
gross income at or about $100,000 a year. The concept of the 
minimum tax which found its way into President Reagan's 
proposal was also retained in the House proposal.
In some ways, it is as interesting to consider what these 
various tax reform proposals do not do. For example, social 
security income will not be taxed more than it is currently. 
Apparently, social security income is just politically untouch 
able. The credit for business research and development activ 
ities is maintained. In a national sense, this credit is not very 
substantial, but it turns out to be very important to firms in 
Michigan. While the original Treasury proposal adopted more 
or less complete indexation of the tax code for inflation 
applying to all of the nominal dollar amounts in the tax code 
as well as the definition of capital income, the political process 
has reduced the degree of indexation substantially. Interest 
ingly, despite substantial popular discussion over the last three 
or four years about flat taxes, none of the proposals is truly a 
flat tax, that is, with one rate. Some progressivity in the rate 
structure is maintained.
During the tax reform debate, state and local government 
officials and their representative interest groups have generally 
been vocal critics of all the tax reform proposals. They have 
criticized the notion of ending the deduction for state and 
local government taxes. They have been vocal critics of 
changing the definition of the kinds of activities for which 
state and local governments can sell bonds, the interest from 
which is not taxed as income in the federal code. In general, 
states are concerned about the interstate distribution of tax 
savings from reform and about how the loss of deductibility
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might affect the ability of state and local governments to raise 
taxes in the future or continue to provide financing for current 
services. Each of those concerns is now considered.
First Concern: Interstate Distribution of Tax Savings
Early consideration of the likely effects of tax reform for 
states focused on the implication for the interstate distribution 
of federal tax reductions (or interstate increases) caused by 
reform. Federal tax reform will not be geographically neutral. 
The residents of some states will benefit more than the 
residents of others, if for no other reason than federal tax 
reform treats different income taxpayers differently, and states 
differ in their income distributions. The U.S. Department of 
the Treasury estimated that the President's proposal would 
have reduced personal income taxes by 7 percent in aggregate, 
with nearly 60 percent of taxpayers receiving some reductions. 
Thus, the likely concern is the relative amount of tax reduction 
by state, i.e., which states have less than a 7 percent aggregate 
reduction and which more. To date, the Treasury Department 
has not released or published any state-by-state analysis of the 
tax reform plan's effect.
One often gets the impression from state and local govern 
ment officials that the interstate distribution of personal tax 
reduction caused by tax reform arises almost entirely from 
changing the deduction for state and local taxes. They suggest, 
obviously, that states with both a relatively large fraction of 
taxpayers who itemize deductions and relatively large 
amounts of deductible taxes stand to "lose" most from 
eliminating the deduction. But many, if not all, of the tax 
features affected by the reform plans have uneven effects on 
the distribution of taxes among the states. Similarly, those tax 
features not curtailed (or perhaps even enhanced) by the plan 
also are significant for any interstate variation in tax burdens.
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These features, too, are not expected to be geographically 
neutral. This fact has been noted by Business Week:
The nondeductibility of state and local taxes is but 
one factor, and probably not the most important 
one, determining states' futures.... If the tax plan is 
enacted in its present form there will be substantial 
variations in its regional impact. But which states 
and regions emerge as the biggest gainers and losers 
may be surprising. (June 17, 1985.)
For example, long-term nonresidential capital gain income 
varies greatly by state. The President's tax reform proposal 
(Treasury II) would have decreased the taxation of capital 
gains, while the House bill would have raised capital gains 
taxes slightly. In 1981, half of all taxable capital gains income 
accrued to residents of just six states: California, Colorado, 
Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. That fact understates 
the concentration, because nearly 35 percent of total capital 
gains income that year went to residents of only three states: 
California (16 percent), Texas (10 percent), New York (9 
percent). If the deduction for state-local taxes were continued 
and the revenue loss made up by increasing the tax on capital 
gains, it is not clear that a state such as New York, whose 
officials have been prominent in opposing the curtailment of 
the state-local tax deduction, would be better off. That is, the 
distribution of any tax change needs to be compared to the 
distributional effects of the substitute tax provision.
As a second example, Clark and Neubig (1984) report the 
volume of new, private purpose tax exempt bonds issued in 
1983 by state. The President's tax reform plan would eliminate 
the interest exemption for many of these state-local bonds. 
But the list of the 10 largest state users of this exemption in 
1983 includes Texas (2), Florida (3), Arizona (8), and Virginia
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(9), none of which are states usually identified as likely losers 
from ending the state-local tax deduction.
Finally, while all of the tax reform proposals would end the 
double personal exemption for senior citizens, both the Pres 
ident's and the House plans would expand the credit for low 
income taxpayers, including low income elderly taxpayers. 
Most of the analyses which I have seen suggest that low 
income elderly taxpayers would be substantially better off 
under either tax reform plan, while higher income elderly 
taxpayers would have smaller than average tax reductions. 
But of all elderly taxpayers with 1981 income less than 
$10,000, nearly 40 percent lived in just six states: California, 
Florida, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Again, 
several states often classified as "losers" from elimination of 
the deduction for state and local taxes apparently stand to 
"gain" from this change in the treatment of elderly taxpayers.
In other words, it is not easy to determine which states' 
residents will be winners and which will be losers, on average, 
from the distribution of federal tax changes. As the tax reform 
proposals are adjusted, maintaining revenue neutrality, there 
may certainly be some surprises about the geographic effects 
of those changes. And to the extent that the tax reform plan 
would tax currently exempt or excluded activities, state-by- 
state data may not be available (certainly from tax sources) to 
estimate the effects.
It may be possible to estimate the interstate distribution of 
personal tax changes due to reform indirectly, however, if one 
is willing to assume that all of the changes can be reflected by 
income. The U.S. Treasury Department estimated, for the 
President's tax plan, the expected percentage reductions in 
personal taxes by income class. That information can be 
combined with income distribution data for each state to 
estimate the aggregate percentage personal tax reductions for
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residents of each state. 1 (See Table 1). Those calculations were 
done by an undergraduate student at Michigan State, Lori 
Brown, and me, using 1981 data. Essentially, we considered 
what the effect of the President's tax proposal would have 
been in 1981.
Table 1 
Interstate Distribution of Tax Features
Federal Tax Change Due to Reform 
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Interstate Distribution of Tax Features—Cont.
Federal Tax Change Due to Reform 
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Source: L. Brown (1986).
We found that adoption of only the personal tax changes in 
the President's tax plan would have increased disposable
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personal income an average of 1.21 percent, with a range from 
1.03 percent in South Dakota to 1.51 percent in Alaska. 
Michigan residents, by the way, would have had a 1.14 
percent increase in disposable personal income. Measured 
instead in terms of percentage tax decreases, the results show 
an average 9 percent decrease in personal taxes, with a range 
of 8.4 percent in Louisiana to 10.8 percent in Maine. Again, 
Michigan is slightly below the average at 8.5 percent. Al 
though this is an admittedly rough approximation, the pattern 
of results is similar to those derived by others who examine the 
effects of specific details of the tax plan. The results suggest 
that while federal tax reform will not be neutral between 
residents of different states, the differences between states are 
not likely to be very substantial, certainly not to the degree 
which has been suggested.
There is one important qualification to all of this. The 
notion of reduced taxes for individuals as a result of federal 
tax reform is an illusion. Because the proposed tax plans are 
designed to raise the same amount of revenue as the current 
structure would have raised, at least by estimation, there will 
be no reduction of total taxes. In essence, the intent is for 
increased corporate tax collections to substitute for reduced 
personal tax collections, with total taxes remaining the same. 
The tax systems proposed in the various plans are designed to 
withdraw approximately the same amount of resources from 
the private economy as the current structure. The myth of 
individual tax reduction is created by separating personal and 
corporate tax payments, and then ignoring the corporate 
payments. For this to make any sense requires that corpora 
tions operate as "black holes," where taxes enter, never to 
reappear. This is nonsense. The tax collected from corpora 
tions may cause higher prices or lower wages or lower returns 
on investment, all of which affect individuals. What tax reform
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will do is alter the distribution of the tax burden among 
individuals.
Second Concern: Effect on Subnational 
Government Programs
The second issue about federal tax reform which concerns 
state and local government officials is whether curtailment of 
the deduction for state and local taxes will affect the ability of 
the states to finance services. The marginal price of state and 
local government services to taxpayers who itemize federal tax 
deductions is increased if state and local taxes can no longer 
be deducted. This increase in tax prices could, in some cases, 
actually bring about reductions from current state or local 
spending levels or, more likely, would slow the growth of 
state-local spending by making it harder to further increase 
state or local tax rates. For instance, the Wall Street Journal 
reported the Alaska revenue commissioner's fear that "resi 
dents would resist the need for new or higher revenue 
collections if the U.S. stops allowing taxpayers to deduct their 
local tax payments," (June 11,1985, p. 58). Because the loss of 
deductibility would particularly raise tax burdens for higher 
income taxpayers, there is concern that some might want to 
leave high tax states or cities. Thus, New York Governor 
Mario Cuomo is quoted as saying "They're pitting state 
against state. A lot of my people will leave New York so that 
they can live where their taxes are lower" (Business Week, 
June 17, 1985).
First of all, it is important to emphasize that even if 
deductibility is retained in a federal tax reform plan, the value 
of that deduction would be reduced, and thus the subsidy to 
state and local governments would also be reduced. The value 
of the state-local tax deduction will be substantially eroded by 
the other features of reform. A larger standard deduction,
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cutbacks in other allowed itemized deductions, and the greater 
personal exemption for nonitemizers which is part of the 
House plan, would all reduce the number of itemizers, so that 
fewer taxpayers would be deducting state-local taxes. Even for 
those taxpayers who would still itemize (and thus deduct 
state-local taxes) the value of the deduction will be smaller 
because tax rates will be lower. Some estimates suggest that as 
much as half of the current value of deductibility would be lost 
even if deductibility remains in the tax code. Therefore, part of 
the loss of the state-local government subsidy occurs generally 
as the result of tax reform (even if that specific deduction is 
retained) and part because of the curtailment of the deduction.
Will the loss of deductibility or the reduced value of 
deductibility matter? Evidence is sparse, but seems to show 
that deductibility has induced states and localities to increase 
spending slightly and to favor certain revenue sources (deduct 
ible taxes, for example) over others. A reduction of deduci 
bility's value, then, might reduce state-local taxes slightly (or 
more correctly, slow their growth) and induce states to alter 
their tax structures. I expect that local governments, in many 
cases, will be affected less by the decreased value of deduct 
ibility than state governments because of state tax incentives. 
Local taxes (mostly property taxes) are deductible against 
state income taxes in 33 states, while 30 states have state 
credits for local property taxes (including Michigan). A 
number obviously have both. These features will become more 
important and will mitigate the effect on property taxpayers of 
a reduction in or loss of federal deductibility.
The following example, based on the Michigan property tax 
credit, illustrates that point. Consider a family of four with a 
$40,000 income, which pays $2,400 in property taxes and has 
a total of $5,000 in federal itemized deductions. Such a family 
receives a Michigan property tax credit of $600 and is in the 25
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percent federal income tax rate bracket. As a result, an 
increase in property taxes of $1 would actually cost this family 
only $.30, after the federal deduction and the state credit. If 
the federal income tax is changed so that the personal 
exemption rises (to $2,000) and tax rates are reduced (this 
family is now in the 15 percent federal rate class), then the 
family's cost of a $1 property tax increase rises to $.40 if no 
deduction for state and local taxes is allowed and to $.34 if the 
deduction is retained.
First, this family's local tax cost rises due to federal tax 
reform even if deductibility is retained. Second, the increases 
in local tax cost due to federal tax reform (with or without 
deductibility) are small. The loss of federal deductibility 
increases this family's marginal property tax cost from $.30 to 
$.40, not from $.75 to $1.00, which would occur without the 
state credit. Without deductibility, the state credit becomes 
more important and offsets a larger amount of local taxes.
Exhibit 1
Marginal Property Tax Cost in Michigan: 
Deduction/Homestead Credit Illustration
Fiscal Details $40,000 Income; 4 Exemptions
$80,000 House; 60 Mill Tax Rate 
$5,000 Itemized Deductions
Homestead Credit = 60% ($2,400-$ 1,400) =
600 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = .4(1-7),
where t = federal marginal tax rate of
itemizer
Current Structure Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $31,000 
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 25% 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.30
Federal Reform-No Deduction: Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $28,000 
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 15% 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.40
Federal Reform-With Deduction: Homestead Credit = $600
Federal Taxable Income = $27,000 
Federal Marginal Tax Rate = 15% 
Marginal Property Tax Cost = $.34
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Summary: Marginal Property Tax Cost
___________________Tax Structure_____
Current, Reform, 
Deducibility Current Reform No Credit No Credit
Yes 130 134 $ .75 $ .85 
No $.40 $.40 $1.00 $1.00
One should also keep in mind that it is possible that the 
demand for state-local government services would rise be 
cause of other effects of federal tax reform. One such factor 
may be the change in the deduction (and thus subsidy) for 
other goods and services which may be strong substitutes for 
or complements to current subnational government services. 
Two potential cases may be charitable activities, the subsidy 
for which would be reduced because of lower marginal tax 
rates and the end of the charitable deduction for nonitemizers, 
and housing, which would be affected by lower rates and the 
possible loss of the deductions for property taxes and interest 
on second homes. These changes are expected to increase the 
marginal costs of both charitable contributions and housing 
consumption. One might expect that the activities of many 
charitable organizations are substitutes for state and local 
government services and expenditures, and it is known that 
charitable contributions are substantially more price-sensitive 
than is the demand for state-local goods. Thus one expects a 
relatively large decline in individual charitable contributions 
due to federal tax reform, which could increase the demand 
for government spending on similar services. The effect of 
changes in housing demand are more problematic, partly 
because the base for local property taxes as well as demand for 
services could be affected.
Finally, because the Treasury Department estimates that 
personal income taxes would decrease by 7 percent overall 
under the President's plan, with more than 58 percent of 
individual taxpayers enjoying some decrease, disposable per-
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sonal income would increase for some taxpayers. Such an 
income gain implies an increase in the demand for subnational 
government spending. Nonitemizers are particularly expected 
to enjoy net tax decreases (that is, income increases) as a result 
of the reform plan. So while the desired level of state-local 
spending might fall for current itemizers because of the 
increased price, desired state-local spending by nonitemizers 
would increase. And nationally, only about 35 percent of 
taxpayers have itemized deductions in recent years.
In a slightly different version of this second concern, Henry 
Thomassen, an adviser to the Governor of Georgia, has 
argued that the biggest problem for states from the loss of 
deductibility is the redistribution of tax burden among dif 
ferent income taxpayers. Mr. Thomassen writes:
Deductibility provides tax expenditures to individu 
als rather than governments. Because of progressive 
income tax systems, the benefits received then differ 
greatly among individuals ... if deductibility were 
suddenly ended, losses would be imposed upon 
taxpayers in inequitable fashion. Today's itemizers 
would carry an enlarged share of both the Federal 
and the State and local taxes. (National Tax Journal, 
September 1985.)
In response to this problem, states can, and I believe will, 
change their own tax structures. States and localities currently 
make use of some revenue sources, such as gasoline taxes, 
license fees, and user charges, which are not deductible. Even 
among deductible taxes there is wide variation in reliance and 
structure across states. One avenue of response for states to 
curtailment of the deduction, then, is change in their revenue 
structure. But if states or localities do change their revenue 
mix as a result of federal tax reform, this would also change 
the equity and efficiency effects of the reform plan. States
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would want to reduce taxes on those residents who lose 
because of curtailment of federal deductibility. Some options 
are less progressive personal income tax rate structures and 
more reliance on business taxes. The result is to work against 
the incentives for those taxpayers to move or for those 
taxpayers to demand less state spending. The burden of the 
loss of deductibility gets spread over all taxpayers and thus the 
magnitude of effects is reduced. I firmly believe that if federal 
tax reform reduces the value of the state and local tax 
deduction uniformly, the states will use fees and direct busi 
ness taxes more heavily than in the past and will adopt less 
progressive personal tax structures. If the state and local tax 
deduction is reduced for only some state and local taxes (such 
as the elimination of the deduction for sales taxes which was 
finally adopted), then states will move away from use of the 
tax which is no longer deductible.
Conclusions
Most economists believe that federal tax reform would be 
more efficient and more attractive if the tax base is broadened 
even more than is currently proposed, and thus tax rates 
lowered more than currently proposed. Such a plan could be 
fashioned by combining some features of the President's plan 
(such as reducing deductions for state and local taxes, con 
sumer interest payments, and some business expenses and 
ending exemptions for some income from tax exempt bonds 
and transfer payments) with some features of the House bill 
(such as increased taxation of capital gains income, an 
effective minimum tax, and a two-tiered personal exemption).
This evening I have considered some of the ways federal tax 
reform might affect state and local governments. It appears 
that tax reform will not be neutral among the states, although 
the differences in changes in tax liabilities among states will
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likely be small. The loss of federal deductibility of state and 
local taxes and tax reform in general will increase the marginal 
cost of state and local tax increases. The result will likely be a 
small decrease in state and local taxes, but much of that effect 
may be offset by changes in state and local governments' tax 
structure, particularly by moving away from taxes which are 
no longer deductible or by adopting less progressive state- 
local tax systems.
In terms of the states' position about tax reform, my point 
of view is that the potential effects on the states have generally 
been overblown. State and local government concerns about 
federal tax reform have also been somewhat misdirected, in 
focusing almost exclusively on the loss of deductibility. Other 
aspects of the tax reform plan, particularly the decreased 
amount of itemizing and the lower rates, will have almost as 
big an effect for state and local governments as the loss of 
deductibility per se.
Regardless of these effects, no one sector of the economy 
should dictate the nature or possibility of tax reform. I think 
it is necessary to move away from thinking about how tax 
reform will affect Joe, how it will affect Michigan, how it will 
affect the computer industry, or how it will affect state and 
local governments. We have to think of what tax reform can 
do for our economy in an overall sense. It is only in that way 
that the diffused positive effects of tax reform can outweigh 
the apparent short-term costs to individual sectors.
The potential promise of tax reform is that taxes become 
less important in economic decision making, less important at 
the margin, as economists like to say. That is accomplished 
largely through the lower tax rates. To maintain revenue 
neutrality, the base in broadened, which improves fairness and 
efficiency as well. Perhaps the clearest "winners" from tax 
reform will be low income workers who will be removed from
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the tax rolls. And the clearest "losers" are likely to be high 
income individuals with substantial capital investments, par 
ticularly in tax shelters. That support for such a change arose 
across the political spectrum is remarkable in itself.
Postscript: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is Adopted
In June 1986, the Senate approved a new tax reform 
proposal developed by the Senate Finance Committee under 
the direction of Chairman Packwood. The Senate bill, which 
in retrospect appears to have been the key to ensuring broad 
political support for reform, differed from the House proposal 
in at least five important ways. The Senate plan included only 
two tax rate classes for personal taxes, 15 and 27 percent. The 
very low top rate made the package particularly attractive, but 
required more base broadening to maintain revenue. There 
fore, the Senate plan phased out the personal exemption for 
families with incomes above $145,000, eliminated the deduc 
tion for consumer interest (except on mortgages), ended the 
deduction for state and local sales taxes, and continued 
deductions for individual retirement accounts only for taxpay 
ers not covered by pension plans. Similarly, the Senate plan 
proposed lower corporate rates, but a broader base, than in 
the House bill.
After lengthy and uncertain conference committee sessions 
during the summer, agreement was reached on a compromise 
plan in August. A fundamental federal income tax reform bill 
was approved by the Congress in September. That version 
maintains two formal personal tax rate classes (15 and 28 
percent), phaseout of the personal exemption (which effec 
tively imposes a higher marginal tax rate on high income 
taxpayers), elimination of the deductions for consumer inter 
est and state and local sales taxes, curtailment of the deduc 
tion for IRA accounts and includes taxation of capital gains
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as ordinary income. Also, losses from most tax shelters, 
so-called "passive" investments, may not be used to offset 
income from other sources. On the corporate side, the top rate 
is 34 percent with the investment tax credit repealed and many 
deductions reduced or eliminated. Minimum taxes were added 
for both individuals and corporations.
This proposal which emerged from the conference commit 
tee was signed into law by President Reagan on October 22, 
1986. The net effect is expected to be a substantial reduction in 
personal tax collections (perhaps about 6 percent) and a 
substantial increase in corporate tax collections.
REFERENCES
Birnbaum, Jeffrey, "Plan to Repeal Reduction for State, Local Taxes May 
Become Focus of the Tax-Revision Fight," Wall Street Journal, June 11, 
1985, p. 58.
Brown, L., "Analysis of Selected Interstate Distributional Effects of the 
President's Tax Plan," research report, MSU, 1985.
Clark, P. and T. Neubig, "Private Activity Tax-Exempt Bonds, 1983," 
Statistics of Income Bulletin, Fall 1984, pp. 97-107.
Congressional Record, April 4, 1967 (cited in Mintz and Cohen, America, 
Inc., Dial Press, 1971, pp. 203-5).
The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and 
Simplicity, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1985.
Thomassen, Henry, "Tax Reform: The View From the States," National 
Tax Journal, September 1985, pp. 295-304.
Walczak, T. and S. Weldstrom, "Will Reagan's Political Magic Work This 
Time?" Business Week, June 17, 1985, pp. 133-136.
NOTE
1. This is far from a perfect procedure. In effect, it assumes that a taxpayer 
with a given income can expect the same percentage reduction in personal 
taxes regardless of state of residence.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the most significant 
antipoverty legislation of the last decade. It is important not 
only for the $5 billion a year in tax relief it provides to the 
working poor but also because it reflects bipartisan support 
for using the tax system to increase the incomes of the working 
poor. 1 The consensus to aid the poor, which emerged during 
debate over the 1986 Act, is particularly important because 
the Reagan administration had previously disavowed using 
tax reform for distributional purposes. In his 1982 Economic 
Report, President Reagan stated:
As a result of the passage of the historic Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, we have set in place a 
fundamental reorientation of our tax laws. Rather 
than using the tax system to redistribute existing 
income, we have significantly restructured it to 
encourage people to work, save and invest more 
(p. 6).
The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), unlike the 1986 
Act, did not aid the working poor. Quite to the contrary, it 
actually increased their tax burdens. In addition to their 
adverse treatment by ERTA, the working poor have been 
adversely affected by two major economic and policy changes. 
First, the economic stagnation of the past 15 years raised 
poverty and income inequality well above the levels of the 
mid-1970s. And, although the current recovery has been long 
and robust, the poor have gained disproportionately little.
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Second, the Reagan budgetary retrenchment of the early 
1980s reduced income transfers and social spending targeted 
on the poor and the near-poor. As a result, many low-income 
families who would have received benefits had social pro 
grams not been cut receive no benefits today. And, despite the 
beneficial effects of the 1986 Act, the poor still have not 
regained their mid-1970s level of living.
Thus, since the early 1970s, changes in all three mechanisms 
by which income is generated and redistributed the market, 
income transfer programs, the tax system have tended to 
increase poverty. As I show below, the prospects for affecting 
the market-generated distribution of poverty or for reforming 
existing income transfer programs are not good. Thus, if 
poverty is to be reduced by 1990 to the level that existed in the 
early 1970s, even if the economy continues to grow without 
recession, we must move beyond the 1986 Tax Act. Although 
the Act eliminated the personal income tax burden for most of 
the poor, I conclude that further tax reforms offer the best 
way to aid the poor particularly the working poor in the 
late 1980s. Reforms such as those discussed below are feasible 
and are preferred by both taxpayers and the poor to reforms 
which would aid the working poor by taking them through the 
welfare system. But first we must ask whether the reduction of 
poverty is a legitimate goal to pursue.
Why Worry About Equity?
Why should an economists worry about the distribution of 
income in general and poverty in particular? Shouldn't s/he be 
interested in raising productivity and in achieving the most 
from society's scarce resources? Shouldn't the pursuit of 
efficiency be the primary goal? Isn't that why most of the 
papers in this volume emphasize the effects of taxes and tax 
reform on work, saving, capital accumulation, and economic 
growth?
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My answer is "yes, but." If we were starting from an initial 
situation in which the endowments that individuals brought to 
the market had been attained in a market free of imperfections 
such as discrimination, then the answer would be much more 
emphatic for the "yes," and much more wavering for the 
"but." Given an initial distribution of income, the market, 
when all the assumptions of perfect competition are met, will 
produce the most efficient allocation of scarce resources. The 
goods to be produced and the resulting prices will determine 
an efficient post-market distribution of income. If however, we 
judge the initial distribution of endowments unfair, then we 
may want to change the distribution of income that results 
from the market, even if it has resulted from a perfectly 
competitive market process.
This highly simplified textbook example is relevant to the 
theme of this paper because the War on Poverty was premised 
on the belief that both the initial endowments being brought 
to the market by the poor and disadvantaged and how those 
endowments were compensated were adversely affected by 
market imperfections. If one accepts these underlying pre 
mises of the War on Poverty as still relevant 20 years later, 
then there remains a basis for public policies that provide 
more equality and less poverty than currently exist.
A call for expanded use of the income tax to aid the poor 
does not tell us how much more aid could promote equity 
without impairing efficiency. Indeed two recent articles, Joel 
Slemrod's "Do We Know How Progressive the Income Tax 
System Should Be?" (1983) and Anthony Atkinson's "How 
Progressive Should Income Tax Be?" (1983) review the liter 
ature on the optimal income tax and reach no definitive 
conclusions. The answer depends, first, on how we value 
various degrees of inequality, that is, on our social welfare
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function; second, on how responsive taxpayers are to mar 
ginal tax rates; and third, on the distribution of endowments 
that generate the pretax (market) distribution of income. In 
general, Slemrod and Atkinson offer little more than the 
boundaries of the trade-offs, guidelines that argue against 
excessively high marginal tax rates without specifying the level 
at which efficiency losses become large.
Alan Blinder (1982) is much less technical, but much more 
eloquent. He concludes that:
. . . what this country needs now in the realm of 
income distribution policy is exactly what it needs, 
and has often been unable to get, in so many other 
problem areas: An economic policy with a hard head 
and a soft heart. A hard head to remind us of the 
wondrous efficiency of the marketplace, and how 
foolish it is to squander this efficiency without good 
reason. And a soft heart to remind us that champi 
oning the cause of society's underdogs has long 
been, and remains one of the noblest functions of 
government (p. 30).
My call for aiding the working poor through tax reform 
rather than welfare reform is based on a review of the 
efficiency effects of income transfer programs (see Danziger, 
Havemen, and Plotnick, 1981). 2 Because welfare programs 
involve much higher marginal tax rates than those put into 
place by the 1986 Tax Act, providing the same amount of aid 
to the poor through tax reform would have a lower efficiency 
cost than would providing it through welfare programs.
Why Not Rely on Economic Growth?
Why argue that the income tax be reformed further to 
provide more aid for the poor? What about the importance of
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economic growth, which raises rather than redistributes in 
come? Again, a careful review of the empirical literature 
suggests that economic growth is necessary, but not sufficient 
to aid many of the poor (see Gottschalk and Danziger, 1984; 
Danziger and Gottschalk, 1986).
This issue was clearly recognized at the early stages of the 
War on Poverty. In 1964, President Johnson stated:
We cannot, and need not wait for the gradual 
growth of the economy to lift this forgotten fifth of 
our nation above the poverty line. We know what 
must be done and this nation of abundance can 
surely afford to do it (p. 15).
Growth was to be an important tool, but only one of many, in 
the fight against poverty.
The Johnson administration set in motion a vast series of 
policy changes that placed the question "What does it do for 
the poor?" at the top of the nation's domestic policy agenda. 
Robert Lampman (1974) has argued that all government 
programs and policies those related to education and trans 
portation, for example, as well as those related to tax and 
income maintenance programs had to explicitly address 
their impact on the poor. In my view, a major barrier to 
reducing poverty today is the fact that this question now is 
asked only rarely.
When President Reagan announced his program for eco 
nomic recovery in 1981, he stated:
The goal of this administration is to nurture the 
strength and vitality of the American people by 
reducing the burdensome, intrusive role of the fed 
eral government; by lowering tax rates and cutting 
spending; and by providing incentives for individu 
als to work, to save, and to invest. It is our basic
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belief that only by reducing the growth of govern 
ment can we increase the growth of the economy 
(p. 1).
Thus, the question "What does it do for the poor?" was 
replaced by the question "What does it do for incentives to 
work and save?" Irving Kristol (1984), expanding on this 
view, stated that:
The administration's social policy cannot be under 
stood apart from its economic policy which is a 
policy of growth not redistribution.
I believe that this shift in domestic priorities helps explain 
why poverty declined rapidly as the economy grew in the late 
1960s and why poverty has declined so slowly in the current 
economic recovery.
Ronald Reagan is not the only one who has chosen not to 
follow the path I am advocating and not to place antipoverty 
policy via tax reform high on the agenda. Henry Aaron, in 
"How to Make the President's Good Tax Reform Plan Even 
Better," (1985) listed three serious problems with the federal 
income tax: (1) a narrow tax base; (2) unnecessarily high 
marginal tax rates that result from the narrowed tax base, 
with both of these problems leading to distortions in con 
sumption, saving, investment, and production; and (3) the 
deficit, that is, too little tax revenue. Also, in Aaron and 
Galper (1985) one finds much concern with horizontal eq 
uity the equal treatment of those with equal incomes as a 
way to reduce the "tax-induced distortions of labor supply, 
saving, investments and risk taking," but little discussion of 
vertical equity or the need to increase the progressivity of the 
existing system.
The president wanted a bill that was both revenue neutral 
and distributionally neutral that is tax reform that broadens
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the tax base and lowers marginal tax rates in such a way as to 
leave total revenue unchanged, that maintains the existing 
degree of progressivity, and achieves horizontal equity. So if 
Aaron only explicitly criticizes revenue neutrality, he must 
implicitly accept distributional neutrality.
It is evident, therefore, that public policy discussion has 
shifted away from a concern with poverty and inequality. Yet 
recent trends in the level and distribution of family incomes 
demonstrate a need for further reform of the personal income tax.
Recent Trends in Family Income
The period since the early 1970s has been not only one of 
economic stagnation but also one of increasing inequality. 
These macroeconomic changes contradicted two of the key 
assumptions of the War on Poverty-Great Society planners. 
First they thought the business cycle could be controlled by 
the tools of Keynesian economics, so that poverty could be 
fought against a background of healthy economic growth. 
Second, they believed that in such an economy, with low 
unemployment rates and with antidiscrimination policies and 
education and training programs in place, everyone rich, 
poor, and middle class would gain. At a minimum, it was 
expected that economic growth would be proportional and 
that all incomes would rise at about the same rate. At best, 
income growth for the poor would exceed the average rate.
The facts demonstrating the failure of these assumptions 
are clear, but explanations for the failure are much more 
difficult. For most of the post-World War II period, family 
income, adjusted for inflation, grew at an annual rate exceed 
ing 3 percent per year. Since 1973, however, growth has 
been minimal. There were three recessions 1974-75, 1979-80, 
1981-82 and unemployment has remained at the 7 percent 
level through the mid-1980s despite the longer-than-average
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length of the current recovery. By historical standards, the 
current recovery is a very good one, but it is a recovery from 
the very depressed levels of 1981, not an economic high-water 
mark for the economy.
Table 1 compares the average annual growth in mean 
family income, adjusted for inflation, for the 1949-1969, 
1967-1973, and 1973-1984 periods. The two postwar decades 
saw rapid growth in family income among both two-parent 
and female-headed families with children. Mean family in 
comes grew by about 6 percent per year. Between 1967 and
Table 1
Average Annual Rate of Growth of Real Family Income, 1949-1969, 
Compared to 1967-1973 and 1973-1984
Annual Rate Annual Rate Annual Rate 
1949-1969a 1967-1973b 1973-1984C


















































Source for 1949 and 1969 data: Computations by the authors from the computer tapes from
the 1950 and 1970 decennial Censuses. 
Note While the Current Population Survey did not collect information on Hispanic origin in
1967, the decennial Censuses did collect those data.
aDefined as 100 x [(1969 real income 1949 real mcome)/1949 real income] -=- 20. 
bDefined as 100 x [(1973 real income 1967 real income)/1967 real income]   6. 
cDefined as 100 x [(1984 real income 1973 real income)/1973 real income] 4-11.
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1973, growth was about 3 percent per year for two-parent 
families and less than 1 percent for female-headed families. 
Growth per year was actually negative from 1973 to 1984 for 
11 of the 12 rows in the table.
Changes in the mean indicate how the "typical" family 
fared, but they obscure the differing patterns of income 
changes that have occurred for families at different positions 
in the income distribution. To see how families of "low," 
"middle," and "high" income have fared, we classify families 
with children into one of five quintiles and compute the 
percentage of income received by each of these fifths of 
families. Changes in income shares provide a useful indicator 
of changes in income inequality.
Just as with mean family income, the trend in quintile 
shares since 1967 differs dramatically from the period covering 
1949 to 1969. Chart 1 shows the change in the proportion of 
aggregate income received by each quintile during the 1949- 
1969 and 1967-1984 periods. During the earlier period, the 
income distribution shifted somewhat toward less inequality 
as the lowest quintile increased its share and the shares of the 
other four quintiles declined a small amount. The share of the 
lowest 20 percent of all families with children increased by 
1.02 percentage points while the share of the highest 20 
percent declined by 0.25 percentage points. Between 1967 and 
1984, inequality increased the income share of the bottom 
three income quintiles declined and the share of the top two 
increased. The share of the bottom quintile declined by 2.43 
percentage points while the share of the top quintile increased 
by 3.59 percentage points.
Table 2 shows the mean income in constant 1984 dollars for 
each quintile of families with children. Also shown are the 
mean incomes of these families and the percentage of persons 
in them with income below the poverty line. 3 The mean
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income in a quintile changes when its income share changes 
and when the amount to be shared (aggregate income) 
changes. For example, between 1967 and 1984, mean income 
for all families increased by 4.1 percent, but the share of the 
lowest quintile declined sufficiently to result in a 34.3 percent 
decline, from $9347 to $6142. Over the same period, the mean 
income of the highest quintile increased from $54,665 to 
$62,198 because its share of the growing mean increased. A 
typical family in the second quintile lost 13 percent ($18,950 to 
$16,491) while one in the fourth quintile gained 11.1 percent 
($33,276 to $36,967). Thus, there were shifts in income not 
only from the poorest to the richest families, but also from 
lower-middle-income to upper-middle-income families.
Table 2
Mean Income of Families with Children by Income Quintile 
in Constant Dollars, 1967-1984 (1984) dollars)






























































"Percentage of all persons in these families with incomes below the official poverty line.
With mean incomes declining and inequality increasing, it 
comes as no surprise that poverty rates increased between 
1973 and 1984. The last column of Table 2 shows the 
incidence of poverty using the federal government's official 
definition of poverty. Poverty for all persons living in families
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with children declined between 1967 and 1973, increased 
somewhat between 1973 and 1979, and then increased rapidly 
between 1979 and 1984.4
What has happened in the past 15 years is clear—income 
growth has been disappointing on average, and poverty and 
inequality have increased. The reasons put forward for these 
disappointing economic developments can be catalogued as 
resulting from demographic changes, from economic changes, 
or from government policy changes. All have been advocated 
as the primary causal factor by one or more analysts. My own 
view is that each has probably been important, but that we do 
not have enough evidence to carefully apportion the blame.
Let me merely list some of these factors:
• Demographic changes. The baby-boom generation surged 
into the labor market, as did wives. The economy created 
many new jobs, but wage rates were often low. The ratio of 
female to male wages did not rise despite the occupational 
and experience gains by many women. Unemployment 
rates remained high. Divorce rates increased as did the 
percentage of children born out of wedlock.
• Oil price shocks. These price changes first caused rapid 
inflation and severe economic dislocations in oil-importing 
areas of the nation; then, deflation and dislocation in 
oil-producing areas.
• Changes in industrial structure. Manufacturing employment 
declined; employment in service industries increased. Inter 
national competition and an aging domestic capital stock 
contributed to these changes.
• Disincentives due to government programs. Because govern 
ment benefits increased at the same time employment 
opportunities decreased, some workers who would have 
taken low-wage jobs dropped out of the labor force and 
drew on government benefits instead. 5
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The Redistributive Effects of the Personal 
Income Tax, 1964-1985
While the income distribution was moving slowly toward 
greater equality in the two post-World War II decades, so was 
the personal income tax. Minarik (1985) notes that the two 
most important devices promoting this trend were the intro 
duction of the minimum standard deduction in 1964 and the 
earned income tax credit in 1975. Progressivity also increased 
for the unintended reason that inflation was pushing middle- 
and upper-middle-class taxpayers into higher and higher 
marginal tax brackets. Many analysts believe that these higher 
marginal tax rates produced great dissatisfaction with the 
personal income tax and contributed importantly to the 
popularity of President Reagan's goal of reduced taxation.
Okner's (1979) simulation analysis shows the total impact of 
the tax cuts of 1964, 1969, and 1975 to have been moderately 
progressive. The top 10 percent of tax filers received about 10 
percent of the 1964 cuts, 1 percent of the 1969 cuts, and actually 
paid increased taxes after the 1975 tax cut. Congress rejected, 
however, a progressive 1978 Carter administration tax-cut pro 
posal. In its place, the 1978 cut Congress enacted allocated only 
about 5 percent of the tax cut to the bottom 50 percent of 
taxpayers, and about half to the top 10 percent.
Okner and Bawden (1983) show that while the 1981 Eco 
nomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) reduced total tax revenues 
by a much larger amount than the 1978 cut, the distribution of 
the cuts was similar. The 1981 cuts were mostly proportional 
with respect to taxes paid. Because a proportional tax cut does 
not aid low-income households which pay no taxes, the 1981 
cuts were regressive with respect to household incomes.
While ERTA addressed the problem of high marginal tax 
rates by cutting the top tax rate to 50 percent on all forms of 
income and by proportionally cutting all other rates, it clearly
100
reversed the pro-poor tilt of all the post-1964 tax changes. 
According to Minarik:
... the 1981 tax law can be judged unambiguously, 
at least by our post-1964 standards, to have been 
unfair to the poor; taxes of sub-median-income 
families have gone up since 1980, while the taxes of 
the better off went down (p. 41).
The anti-poor effects of the 1981 tax law, in marked contrast 
to the pro-poor effects of the 1986 Act, were not explicitly 
discussed in Congress.
The tilt toward the poor and near-poor up to 1975, and the 
tilt away from them between 1975 and 1985 are evident in 
Table 3, which is adapted from Steuerle and Wilson (1986). 
The first six columns show the average and marginal income 
tax rates for a four-person family with income at one-half the 
median income and at the poverty line, for selected years 
between 1950 and 1985, and projections for 1990. Column 7 
shows the total (employer plus employee) payroll tax rates 
that might be added to both the average and marginal rates if 
one were to examine the combined effects of federal taxes.
In the case of the federal personal income tax, 1975 marks 
the year of its most progressive treatment of the poor. This 
was the year in which the earned income tax credit (EITC), 
which subsidizes the earnings of low-income families with 
children, was introduced. In the next decade, all three major 
pro-poor devices in the personal income tax were severely 
eroded by inflation—the EITC, the minimum standard deduc 
tion (also known as the zero bracket amount), and the 
personal exemption. For example, in 1975, because of the 
EITC, a family of four at the poverty line received a federal 
income tax credit of $250 (-4.55 percent of $5497). By 1985, 
this family paid $370 in income taxes (3.37 percent of 
$10,988), for an increase of $620. If one adds the increased
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social security taxes over this decade, then the increased tax 
burden is about equal to the amount of food stamps the 
poverty-line family of four could have received in 1985. (But 
food stamps do not fully offset the taxes of all of the poor 
because some families at the poverty line are ineligible for 
food stamps due to asset limits or other administrative rules, 
and others fail to apply for them.)
As discussed in the next section, by 1990, the average tax 
rate will again be negative for this poverty-line family because 
all three pro-poor devices—the standard deduction, the per 
sonal exemption, and the EITC were increased and indexed to 
inflation by the 1986 Act. Also, the marginal tax rate in 1990 
will drop back to the 1975 level.
Table 3 
Average and Marginal Income Tax Rates for Four-Person Families*














































































Source: Adapted from Steuerle and Wilson (1986).
aA negative rate implies that the earned income tax credit exceeded the tax liability.
bEmployer plus employee share.
cSteuerle and Wilson's projection
Table 3 also shows that a family at one-half the median (a level 
in 1985 that was about 150 percent of the poverty line) was aided 
only slightly by the 1986 Act. Its average tax rate in 1990 will be 
midway between the 1975 and 1985 average rates. But the 
difference in rates between 1985 and 1990 is only 1 percent of 
family income for those at one-half the median, while it is almost
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9 percent for the family at the poverty line. This result reinforces 
my view that further tax relief should be targeted on the 
low-income population.
The data presented thus far make it clear that the trend toward 
greater poverty and income inequality did not begin with the 
election of Ronald Reagan. In fact, much of the damage on both 
the income side and tax side occurred because of the high rates 
of inflation of the late 1970s. Inflation eroded the value of the 
pro-poor income transfers (which, except for those to the aged, 
were not indexed to prices) and the pro-poor components of the 
personal income tax. But the trends were unabated under 
Reagan, even though inflation slowed, because transfers were cut 
as part of the budgetary retrenchment and ERTA did nothing to 
correct the past or prevent further erosion of the pro-poor tax 
components.
That the recent tax changes have been quantitatively impor 
tant can be seen in Table 4, which shows Census Bureau data 
that account for all taxes paid. Unlike the data presented thus 
far, these data allow us to break the increased inequality in the 
income share of households between 1980 and 1983 into two 
components. The first, shown in column 5, is due to changes in 
money income before taxes, reflecting (1) changes in cash income 
transfer programs, (2) results from recession, and (3) other 
economic factors. The second component, shown in column 6, 
reflects changes in state and local as well as federal income and 
payroll taxes.
The total difference between 1980 and 1983 in after-tax 
income shares, shown in column 7, reveals that each of the 
bottom four quintiles lost ground over this three-year period. 
The top quintile increased its income share by 1.4 percentage 
points, which amounts to a net increase of about $2000 per 
household. The decline in the income share of the first quintile 
was due entirely to pretax income changes. The declines for the
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other three were splint between pretax changes and tax changes. 
About one-third of the increased income share of the highest 
quintile was due to tax changes.
Unpublished tabulations from the Congressional Budget Of 
fice show a similar effect of federal tax changes on poverty. They 
show that in 1979, 675,000 people were taken into poverty by 
federal taxes; by 1984, this number had increased to 2,426,000.
Thus, a significant portion of the trend toward greater poverty 
and inequality in the period since the mid-1970s can be attrib 
uted to either direct government tax and transfer policy changes 
or to the failure of government policy to respond to poor 
economic performance. Although precise data that fully account 
for changes in taxes paid and all types of noncash transfers and 
employer-provided fringe benefits received are unavailable, it is 
probably the case that the distribution of after-tax income is 
more unequal today than at any time in the past 30 years.
Table 4
Percentage Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth 
of Households, before and after Taxes, 1980 and 1983
Difference Between 1980 and 










































































Source: For 1980, U.S Department of Commerce (1983), p 11; for 1983, U S. Department
of Commerce (1985), p. 3. 
aDefined as (column 3 - column 1).
bDefined as (column 4 - column 3)—(column 2 - column 1) 
cDefined as (column 6 + column 5), which is equal to (column 4 - column 2). 
dMay not sum to 100.0 or 0.0 because of rounding
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The major goal of the 1986 Tax Reform Act was to lower 
tax rates and broaden the tax base. The law now has only two 
tax brackets—15 percent and 28 percent (although because of 
the surcharge and phaseout of the personal exemption at 
higher income levels, some taxpayers will face an effective rate 
of 33 percent). And many tax preferences were reduced or 
eliminated. The 1986 Act departed somewhat from distribu 
tional neutrality by raising corporate taxes. As a result, it 
provided disproportionate tax relief to the working poor while 
approximating revenue neutrality.
The major changes benefiting the poor are the increase in 
the personal exemption from $1080 to $2000 by 1989; an 
increase in the standard deduction for joint filers from $3670 
to $5000 and for single heads of households from $2480 to 
$4400; and an increase in the maximum earned income tax 
credit from $550 to $800 by 1987. All of these devices are also 
indexed for inflation. As a result, about six million poor and 
near-poor taxpayers will be removed from the tax rolls.
Except for the poor, however, there will be little change in 
the overall progressivity of the income tax. This is because the 
expanded tax base increased progressivity to about the same 
extent as the reduced number of tax brackets lowered progres 
sivity. 6 Table 5 shows recent estimates of the distributional 
effects of the 1986 Act (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 1986). For each income class, column (1) shows the 
average tax change; column (2), the average 1986 tax liability; 
and column (3) the percentage change in tax liability. Since the 
percentage reduction in tax liability generally falls as income 
rises, the overall effect is progressive.
There are, however, very large differences within income 
classes. Minarik (1986) refers to the Act as a "massive
105
Table 5 
























































Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (1986).
aDefined as column 1, tax change, divided by 1986 tax liability that would have resulted if Tax
Act had not been passed times 100.
reshuffling," that is, as one primarily promoting horizontal 
equity. He points out that in the highest income brackets, the 
net change shown in Table 5 results from a situation in which 
about 45 percent of filers in the highest income bracket face 
tax increases of about $50,000, while the remaining 55 percent 
have tax reductions of about $53,000.7 Taxpayers with similar 
incomes will now pay tax rates that are much more similar 
than before because of the expanded tax base and the reduced 
number of tax brackets.
Under the new law, many fewer people will be taxed into 
poverty by the federal income tax and many more families 
with children will receive credits from the expanded EITC. 
Yet these changes will do little to offset the large increase in 
poverty and inequality that characterizes the period since 
1973. It is against this background of economic and policy
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changes that I advocate further tax reforms targeted on the 
poor and near-poor.
Some Further Tax Reforms
What else would I do to reform the income tax in such a 
way as to provide greater assistance to the working poor and 
near-poor without taking them through the welfare system? 
Ideally, I would replace the personal exemption with a per 
capita refundable credit. Lerman (1985) proposes an annual 
$600 refundable per capita credit which would be made 
available only to those who do not itemize deductions. Such a 
credit would be administered in the same fashion as the 
Internal Revenue Service currently administers the EITC. 
With a marginal tax bracket of 15 percent, a $600 credit would 
be equal to an exemption of about $4000; for the 28 percent 
bracket it equals an exemption of $2143. Thus almost all of 
the additional costs associated with the credit would be 
targeted on taxpayers in the 15 percent bracket. Obviously, a 
refundable per capita credit better targets foregone revenue on 
those with lower incomes than would be the case if the same 
amount of revenue was foregone by raising the personal 
exemption.8
An even more ambitious proposal (Garfinkel and Have- 
man, 1983) would raise the value of the per capita refundable 
credit, and in return replace both the personal exemption and 
the Food Stamp program. The rationale is that such credits 
can effectively target funds upon the poor, lower their mar 
ginal tax rate, and avoid the stigmatization of recipients and 
the higher administrative costs of welfare programs. For 
example, a family of four with no other income is currently 
eligible for about $4000 per year in Food Stamps and faces a 
benefit reduction rate (marginal tax rate) in that program of 
33 percent. With a refundable credit of $1000 per person, the
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family with no other income is equally well off, and the only 
marginal tax rate comes from the payroll tax, not the sum of 
the payroll tax and Food Stamp rates.9 Of course, since the 
current personal exemption is not refundable, and many poor 
and near-poor families do not participate in the Food Stamp 
program, such a change would require additional revenues.
The lower marginal tax rates in the reformed income tax, 
however, provide a more efficient mechanism for raising 
revenue to aid low-income families than did the old rates. 
With the lower rates, the work disincentive effects of raising 
taxes decline. Assume, for example, that these refundable 
credits will be financed by broadening the tax base—say, by 
taxing the employers' contribution for health insurance. With 
only two brackets, a smaller percentage of the population will 
be shifted into a higher marginal tax bracket by this base- 
broadening than would have been so shifted under the 
pre-1986 rate structure. For most people then, any base- 
broadening will have only an income effect (reduced income) 
promoting greater work effort; only a small number will have 
an altered substitution effect (since few change tax brackets) 
promoting lower work effort. For the beneficiaries of such 
expanded credits, the income effect will lead to less work but 
the substitution effect will lead to more work because the 
credits will take the place of a welfare program, which had 
higher marginal tax rates.
A second reform would make the child care tax credit 
refundable. The current nonrefundable credit allows couples, 
when both spouses work, and working single parents, to 
partially offset work-related child care costs. Only about 1 
percent of the poor two-parent families and 6 percent of poor 
single-parent families make use of the nonrefundable credit 
(Steuerle and Wilson, 1986). One the other hand, higher- 
income taxpayers receive credits up to $960 if they have more 
than one child and if they spend at least $4800 on care.
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The credit begins at 30 percent for families with incomes 
below $10,000. Consider the case of a single mother of one 
child who works part time, earns $5.00 per hour for 1500 
hours per year, and spends $1.50 per hour, or $2250, to keep 
her child in a day care center while she works. If this is her 
only income, she will not have a positive income tax liability 
(indeed the expanded EITC will offset a portion of her social 
security taxes). Her potential child care credit—$675, or 30 
percent of $2250—is thus of no value to her because it is not 
refundable. Refunding this credit would not only raise her net 
income, it would also make welfare recipiency less attractive.
Conclusion
In sum, I have argued that the 1986 Tax Act was an 
important addition to antipoverty policy. However, in the late 
1980s, inequality of family income is continuing to increase, 
and poverty is only slowly declining, despite a robust eco 
nomic recovery. The pro-poor extensions of tax reform that I 
have proposed would not threaten any of the efficiency 
accomplishments of the recent tax reform and would have 
much smaller work and family disincentive effects than would 
any alternative plan to aid the poor through the welfare 
system.
The Tax Reform Act has helped to refocus attention on the 
question "What does it do for the poor?" The further reforms 
suggested here reemphasize this question without rejecting the 
Reagan-era question "What does it do for incentives to work 
and save?"
REFERENCES
Aaron, H. 1985. "How to Make the President's Good Tax Reform Plan 
Even Better," Brooking Review, 3, 3-9.
Aaron, H., and Galper, H. 1985. Assessing Tax Reform. Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution.
109
Atkinson, A. 1983. "How Progressive Should Income Tax Be?" Chapter 
15 in his Social Justice and Public Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
295-314.
Blinder, A. 1982. The Truce in the War on Poverty: Where Do We Go from 
Here? Washington, D.C.: National Policy Exchange, Paper #3.
Danziger, S., and Gottschalk, P. 1986."Do Rising Tides Lift All Boats? 
The Impact of Secular and Cyclical Changes on Poverty," American 
Economic Review, 76, 405-410.
Danziger, S., Haveman, R., and Plotnick, R. 1981. "How Income Trans 
fer Programs Affect Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A 
Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, 19, 975-1028.
Danziger, S., and Weinberg, D. 1986. Fighting Poverty: What Works and 
What Doesn't. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Garfinkel, I., and Haveman, R. 1983. "Income Transfer Policy in the 
United States," in E. Seidman, ed., Handbook of Social Intervention. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Gottschalk, P., and Danziger, S. 1984. "Macroeconomic Conditions, In 
come Transfers and the Trend in Poverty," in D. L. Bawden, ed., The 
Social Contract Revisited. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 
185-215.
Hall, R., and Rabushka, A. 1985. The Flat Tax. Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press.
Johnson, L. 1964. "Letter of Transmittal" to Economic Report of the 
President, 1964. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Kristol, I. 1984. "'Fairness' and Income Equalizing," Wall Street Journal, 
May 2.
Lampman, R. 1974. "What Does It Do for the Poor?" Public Interest, No. 
34, 66-82.
Lerman, R. 1985. "Separating Income Support from Income Supplemen 
tation," Journal of the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, 10, 101-125.
Minarik, J. 1985. Making Tax Choices. Washington, D.C.: Urban Insti 
tute Press.
Minarik, J. 1986. "Tax Reform. What Does It Mean?" Urban Institute 
Policy and Research Report, 16, 1-5. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
Murray, C. 1984. Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980. New 
York: Basic Books.
110
Okner, B. 1979. "Distributional Aspects of Tax Reform during the Past 
Fifteen Years," National Tax Journal, 32, 11-27.
Okner, B., and Bawden, D. 1983. "Recent Changes in Federal Income 
Redistribution Policy," National Tax Journal, 36, 347-360.
Reagan, R. 1981. America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic 
Recovery. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, The White 
House.
Reagan, R. 1982. "Letter of Transmittal" to Economic Report of the 
President, 1982. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Slemrod, J. 1983. "Do We Know How Progressive the Income Tax Should 
Be?" National Tax Journal, 36, 361-369.
Steuerle, E. and Wilson, P. 1986. "The Taxation of Poor and Lower 
Income Workers," in J. Meyer, ed., Ladders Out of Poverty. Washing 
ton, D.C.: Report of the Project on the Welfare of Families.
U.S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. 1986."Antipoverty Effective 
ness of Cash and Noncash Transfers (Including Federal Income and 
Payroll Taxes)," unpublished tables. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Budget Office.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Taxation. 1986. "Distributional 
Effects of Conference Compromise," mimeo., October 1.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1983. Estimating 
After-Tax Money Income Distributions Using Data from the March 
Current Population Survey. Current Population Reports, Series P-23, 
No. 126. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1985. After-Tax 
Money Income Estimates of Households: 1983. Current Population 
Reports, Series P-23, No. 143. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.
NOTES
1. As an indication of the relative magnitude of the tax relief, note that the 
total cost of Food Stamp benefits is estimated at $10.9 billion in fiscal year 
1987.
Ill
2. This review suggests that total spending on all major income transfer 
programs reduced annual hours of work in the economy by about 4.8 
percent in the late 1980s. One should not conclude from this that marginal 
changes in transfer programs would cause large efficiency losses.
3. The federal government's official measure of poverty provides a set of 
income cutoffs adjusted for household size, the age of the head of the 
household, and the number of children under age 18. (Until 1981, sex of 
the head and farm/nonfarm residence were other distinctions.) The cutoffs 
provide an absolute measure of poverty that specifies in dollar terms 
minimally decent levels of consumption. To make them represent the same 
purchasing power each year, the official poverty thresholds are updated 
yearly by an amount corresponding to the change in the Consumer Price 
Index. In 1985, the poverty lines ranged from $7231 for a family of two to 
$22,083 for a family of 9 or more; the line for a family of four was $10,989.
4. Care must be taken in interpreting the official poverty data. When the 
poverty thresholds were set in the mid-1960s, the poor received few in-kind 
transfers and paid little in taxes. Therefore, one could at that time 
legitimately compare cash income with the official poverty lines to obtain 
a fairly accurate picture of resources available to meet the families' needs. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, noncash transfer benefits 
increased rapidly. While these noncash benefits represented only 12 
percent of outlays on income-tested programs in 1966, the figure had risen 
to about 70 percent by 1983. Clearly a better measure of a family's ability 
to meet its needs should include the value of in-kind programs.
Likewise, taxes detract from the availability of resources to meet needs. 
If taxes had not increased very much over this period they could be 
ignored, since the original poverty definition was based on income before 
taxes.
Unfortunately, we do not have a consistent time series for poverty which 
adjusts for both taxes and the value of in-kind transfers. Nonetheless, 
while the inclusion of in-kind transfers would reduce the extent of poverty 
in any single year, and the subtraction of taxes paid would increase it, they 
would not significantly alter the trends discussed here.
5. My own view is that the disincentive effects of government programs 
have been exaggerated in the media and in such books as Charles Murray's 
Losing Ground (1984). For a review, see Danziger and Weinberg (1986).
6. The issue of increasing the progressivity of the income tax is completely 
separate from the move from multiple tax brackets to only a few brackets.
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Hall and Rabushka (1985) show this explicitly in The Flat Tax, by 
presenting a table that shows various combinations of an adult exemption 
and a marginal tax rate that raise the same revenue. For example, while 
their basic plan contains an adult allowance of $5500 and a rate of 19 
percent, one could choose an equal-cost more progressive plan with an 
allowance of $6600 and a rate of 23 percent.
7. Minarik's estimate was made before the tax bill was finalized. These 
numbers are, thus, merely suggestive of the reshuffling created by the Act.
8. For the poor, a refundable credit is clearly preferable to the exemption. 
Consider a family with no tax liability under current law—that is, all of its 
exemptions and deductions exactly offset its tax liability. Now assume that 
the family has another child. The additional exemption is worth nothing if 
family income is unchanged. However, the family would receive the full 
value of the refundable credit.
9. Depending on the amount of earnings, however, the relevant compar 
ison may be between the 33 percent rate under Food Stamps and a 22 
percent rate: the sum of the employee share of the payroll tax and the first 
bracket rate of 15 percent. This is because, under the exemption, the 
marginal income tax is zero until a tax threshold is reached which equals 
the sum of the standard deduction and the exemptions, while under a per 
capita credit, the tax threshold falls to the standard deduction only.
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